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The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
by
KAREN NELSON MOORE*
During the last decade the Supreme Court has become increasingly
fond of using the plain meaning doctrine1 to interpret the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Indeed, during the last several terms of the Court, a
number of key decisions interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, especially those interpreting infamous Rule 11,2 have linged on a
majority's view of the plain meaning of a Rule's language. Although this
development parallels a similar development in statutory construction, it
is particularly puzzling in the context of the Federal Rules,3 which are
created under the Court's supervision and are approved by the Court
before becoming effective.
While the Court has been heading towards a plain meaning ap-
proach to analyzing the Federal Rules, the rulemaking process has been
undergoing some change. In the past, the Advisory Committees, which
formulate the initial drafts of proposed Rules, operated somewhat in the
background and with little public attention. Recent statutory amend-
ments, however, have broadened the process, effectively resulting in a
sunshine law for the promulgation of the Federal Rules. In light of these
changes in the promulgation process, it is especially important to ex-
amine the appropriate role for the Supreme Court in interpreting the
Federal Rules.
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve Law School. A.B. 1970, J.D. 1973 Harvard
University. I would like to thank Kelly Jackson, my research assistant while I was Visiting
Professor at Harvard Law School, and Karen Evans, my research assistant at Case Western
Reserve, for their helpful assistance.
1. The plain meaning doctrine requires courts to focus on the text of a statute and usu-
ally to reject reference to legislative intent, history, or policy goals. See infra notes 156-167
and accompanying text.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. This rule establishes duties of investigation and certification by
attorneys and imposes sanctions for noncompliance. It has produced substantial controversy.
See infra Part II.A.
3. Throughout this Article the terms "Federal Rules" and "Rules" will be used to refer
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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This Article proposes that the Supreme Court should take a more
activist role in interpreting the Federal Rules by including an analysis of
purpose and policy and should refrain from excessive reliance upon the
plain meaning doctrine. The Court's interpretation of the Federal Rules
does not involve the same separation of powers issues inherent in cases
involving normal statutory construction, because the Court is interpret-
ing rules Congress empowered it to create, not statutes created by a
coequal branch.
A more activist role in interpretation is consistent with the spirit of
the Federal Rules, as enunciated in Rule l's admonition that the Rules
"shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion of every action."'4 Indeed, the failure to heed this admonition and
the concomitant adoption of a literalist or plain meaning approach may
result in an unduly stingy interpretation of a Rule, requiring an unneces-
sary amendment. A more activist role for the Court in interpreting the
Federal Rules is also consistent with the congressional intent behind the
Rules Enabling Act-that the Court promulgate rules of procedure sub-
ject to the constraint that the rules not modify substantive law. More-
over, a more activist approach is not inconsistent with Congress's recent
revamping of the rulemaking framework.
Part I of this Article explores the basic framework for procedural
rulemaking. Section A explains the relationship between the Supreme
Court and Congress in the promulgation of the Federal Rules. This rela-
tionship, established by the 1934 Rules Enabling Act, involves a delega-
tion by Congress to the Court of the power to promulgate procedural
rules, subject to oversight by Congress. Congress's oversight of and in-
volvement in the rulemaking process has increased in the last two de-
cades. Section B focuses on the role of the judicial branch in
promulgating the Federal Rules. It describes the role of committees in
drafting proposals, the modem efforts to improve communication re-
garding proposals, and the views of the Justices concerning their
rulemaking function. Section C concludes that, notwithstanding some
recent change in the relationship between the Court and Congress in the
rulemaking framework, the Court must continue actively to interpret the
Federal Rules.
Part II addresses the Court's recent approach to interpreting the
Federal Rules, with its emphasis on the plain meaning doctrine. Section
A illustrates the Court's use of plain meaning analysis to interpret a par-
ticular Federal Rule, Rule 11. Section B compares the Court's use of
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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plain meaning analysis in cases interpreting federal procedural statutes.
Section C develops the argument for rejecting the use of the plain mean-
ing doctrine in interpreting the Federal Rules. Finally, Section D pro-
poses a preferred analysis that includes factors such as purpose and
policy, as well as textual language, and demonstrates how this analysis
would work in interpreting a Rule.
I. The Basic Rulemaking Framework
The basic framework for rulemaking was first established in the
Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and has been modified by subsequent legisla-
tion. For purposes of this Article, two aspects of the rulemaking frame-
work are critical to understanding the Court's rulemaking role: the
relationship between the Supreme Court and Congress in the promulga-
tion of the Rules, and the mechanisms employed by the Court pursuant
to its statutory mandate to promulgate the Rules.
A. The Relationship Between the Supreme Court and Congress in the
Promulgation of the Federal Rules
(1) The Rules Enabling Act
The Rules Enabling Act in its current formulation provides, "The
Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice
and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district
courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of
appeals."-5 This modem formulation, enacted by Congress in 1988 as
part of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act,6 was part
of an effort "to modernize the statutory framework for the Federal court
rulemaking process"7 by providing a uniform mechanism for developing
rules of procedure and evidence. 8 In essence the modem formulation
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1988). The Rules Enabling Act was initially promulgated in
1934. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064. The original statutory lan-
guage provided that "the Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to pre-
scribe, by general rules, for the district courts of the United States and for the courts of the
District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and
procedure in civil actions at law." Id It also authorized the consolidation of rules for cases in
equity with those for actions at law. Id § 2. The history of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934
has been exhaustively illuminated and will not be described here. See, eg., Stephen B. Bur-
bank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982) [hereinafter Burbank,
Rules Enabling 4ct].
6. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988).
7. H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 23 (1988).
8. Before the 1988 legislation, § 2072 provided only for rules of civil procedure. Sepa-
rate statutory authorizations were required for other areas. See, eg., Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub.
L. No. 93-595, § 2(a)(1), 88 Stat. 1926, 1948-49, amended by Act of Dec. 12, 1975, Pub. L.
July 1993]
carries forward the concept of the original Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
by which Congress delegated to the court the power to promulgate the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Supreme Court's power to prescribe rules of procedure has been
limited from the beginning by the requirement that "[s]uch rules shall
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."9 The impact of
this requirement has been a source of substantial controversy in the
courts and among commentators over the years. 10 One aspect of the con-
troversy is the extent to which the second sentence of the Rules Enabling
Act, prohibiting the modification of substantive rights, differs from
rather than duplicates the first sentence, mandating the creation of prac-
tice and procedure rules.I' Another aspect of the controversy is whether
the restriction against affecting substantive rights was intended to further
federalism principles or to further separation of powers principles. In
other words, was the restriction against affecting substantive rights in-
tended primarily as a limit on the federal government vis-a-vis the states,
or as a limit on the Supreme Court vis-a-vis Congress? 12
No. 94-149, § 2, 89 Stat. 805, 806, both repealed by Judicial Improvements and Access to
Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IV, § 401(c), 102 Stat. 4642, 4650 (1988) (rules of
evidence).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988). See also Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-
415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (providing that "[s]aid rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor mod-
ify the substantive rights of any litigant").
10. The Court has explored the limits of its rulemaking powers in a series of cases, nota-
bly Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941), and Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472
(1965). In Hanna the Court wrote:
[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing
the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate
matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and pro-
cedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.
Id. at 472.
A spirited literature exists concerning the meaning of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and
the interrelationship between the first sentence of the Act, authorizing the promulgation of
rules of procedure, and the second sentence of the Act, prohibiting modification of substantive
rights. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's "Sub-
stance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012 [hereinafter Bur-
bank, Hold the Corks]; Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 5; Paul D. Carrington,
"Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281 [hereinafter
Carrington, Substance and Procedure]; John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87
HARV. L. Rnv. 693 (1974).
11. Compare Ely, supra note 10, at 718-40 (discussing the interrelationship between the
first and second sentences of the Rules Enabling Act and criticizing the merging of two con-
cepts into one) with Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 5, at 1107-08 (concluding that
second sentence was surplusage). This debate does not directly affect the determination of the
Court's proper role in interpreting the Rules.
12. Compare, e.g., Ely, supra note 10, at 718-40 (focusing on federalism principles) with
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The major Supreme Court cases construing the Rules Enabling Act,
particularly Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 13 and Hanna v. Plumer, 14 focused
on federalism principles as the primary reason for the restriction against
affecting substantive rights. In these cases the Court was concerned
mainly with the possible impact of the Federal Rules on substantive
rights conferred by the states and viewed the Rules Enabling Act's re-
quirements in light of these federalism concerns. 15
Despite the Court's apparent preoccupation with federalism, com-
mentators have placed recent emphasis on the relationship between Con-
gress and the Court in the rulemaking process as the source of the
restriction against affecting substantive rights. Integral to this change in
emphasis is Professor Stephen Burbank's thesis that the lengthy history
of the 1934 Rules Enabling Act itself reflects a primary concern with
allocating the power to make law between the -legislative and judicial
branches. 16 Professor Burbank's detailed review of the history behind
the original legislation supports the theory that the major purpose of the
limiting language in the Rules Enabling Act was to confine the Court to
the procedural arena and restrain it from making substantive law, which
was to remain the prerogative of Congress. This theory is particularly
sensible in light of the fact that the Erie17 doctrine, with its emphasis on
federalism principles, was not created until 1938, four years after the
Rules Enabling Act was passed. When the Rules Enabling Act was
promulgated, Swift v. Tyson 18 counseled that the federal courts were free
to fashion federal common law when neither the state legislature nor
Congress had acted, making federalism issues relatively unimportant.
This recent emphasis on the allocation of power between Congress
and the Court in the original Rules Enabling Act became a focal point in
the amending and modernizing of the legislation in the late 1980s.
Although the language of the 1988 amendment tracks the original lan-
guage regarding the dichotomy between substance and procedure, 19 the
legislative history of the amendment addresses at some length the need to
confine the Court to its appropriate procedural rulemaking role and to
Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 5, at 1025-26, 1036, 1106-07 (emphasizing principle
of allocation of power between Congress and Supreme Court).
13. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
14. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
15. See generally Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 5, at 1027-35; Carrington,
Substance and Procedure, supra note 10, at 286 n.35, 298.
16. Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 5, at 1025-26, 1036, 1106-07.
17. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
18. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
19. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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leave substantive lawmaking to Congress. Based on its perception that
the Court had in recent years "overstepped the bounds of its rule making
authority," 20 the House Committee on the Judiciary was concerned that
neither the Court's past decisions nor the language in the Rules Enabling
Act of 1934 was sufficiently clear concerning the limitations on power
delegated by Congress to the Court.21 As a result, the Committee en-
deavored to express its views on the limitations on judicial power encom-
passed in Congress's delegation of rulemaking power under the 1988
version.
The 1985 Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary clearly
asserted Congress had the power to limit judicial rulemaking and had
done so in the Rules Enabling Act by delegating "only a portion of [its]
power" to the Court.22 Speaking specifically to the restriction against
interference with substantive rights, the Committee read the Rules En-
abling Act as restricting the Court from promulgating rules that "neces-
sarily and obviously define or limit rights under the substantive law,"' 23
20. H.R. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 HOUSE RE-
PORT]. (Technical and typographical errors in the Report were corrected at 132 CONG. REC.
E177 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1986)). The primary examples cited were the proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence and the proposals to amend FED. R. CIV. P. 68 regarding fee shifting when the
judgment received is less than an offer of settlement. 1985 HOUSE REPORT at 12-13. An
additional list named twenty statutes in which Congress had intervened with respect to propos-
als for amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id.
at 8-9 n.20.
21. According to the Committee, the language in the Rules Enabling Act authorizing the
creation of rules of practice and procedure which do not abridge, enlarge, or modify any sub-
stantive right,
[a]s interpreted by the Court .... has little if any determinative content. As a result,
the rules enabling acts have failed to provide guidance to the rulemakers or to Con-
gress in considering the validity of proposed rules.
It appears that, as used in the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, the restriction re-
garding substantive rights was intended to emphasize some of the limitations on the
delegation of prospective lawmaking power thought to inhere in the notion of court
rules of "practice and procedure." Because there is no shared conception of such
limitations today, the Committee believes that it must take some care in stating its
views on the scope of Congress' delegation under proposed section 2072.
Id. at 20-21 (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 21.
23. Id. According to the Committee:
[T]he bill does not confer power on the Supreme Court to promulgate rules regarding
matters, such as limitations and preclusion, that necessarily and obviously define or
limit rights under the substantive law. The protection extends beyond rules of sub-
stantive law, narrowly defined, however. At the least, it also prevents the application
of rules, otherwise valid, where such rules would have the effect of altering existing
remedial rights conferred as an integral part of the applicable substantive law
scheme, federal or state, such as arrangements for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988.
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or that "necessarily and obviously require consideration of policies ex-
trinsic to the business of the courts." 24 With these restrictions, the Court
could promulgate rules governing matters "peculiarly within the compe-
tence of judges," and Congress could focus on matters within its compe-
tence in light of its democratic nature.25 These views were reaffirmed by
the House Committee on the Judiciary in its 1988 Report accompanying
the bill that became the Rules Enabling Act of 1988.26
Thus, embedded in this outwardly simple statutory framework for
the promulgation of the Rules is the resolution of a major separation of
powers controversy: Who should have the power to promulgate rules of
procedure for the federal courts and how is that power limited? The
view of the House Committee is not inconsistent with the received wis-
dom that Congress has the power to prescribe general rules of procedure
for the federal courts under Articles I and III of the Constitution.27
Id. at 21-22 (citations omitted). Thus, the Committee gave a broad reading to the scope of
substantive law, which the Court was precluded from regulating, and retained for Congress
rulemaking powers in the arguably substantive areas.
24. Id. at 22. The Report stated:
More generally, proposed section 2072 is intended to allocate to Congress, as op-
posed to the Supreme Court exercising delegated legislative power, lawmaking
choices that necessarily and obviously require consideration of policies extrinsic to
the business of the courts, such as the recognition or non-recognition of a testimonial
privilege. In the absence of congressional choices, prospective regulation is left to the
States.
Id. (citations omitted). Here and elsewhere in the Report, Professor Burbank's Rules En-
abling Act is cited as support. See also id. at 6 n.5, 7 (describing Burbank as "the leading
academic authority in the area").
25. Id. at 22. Again the full language of the Report is instructive:
So viewed, proposed section 2072 leaves to the Supreme Court primary responsibility
for prospective federal regulation of matters peculiarly within the competence of
judges. It reserves to Congress decisions concerning prospective federal regulation of
matters peculiarly within its competence, having regard to Congress' representative
nature and to its experience in prospective lawmaking that variously affects its con-
stituencies in their out-of-court affairs. Further refinement of the scope of delegation
will undoubtedly prove necessary. The Committee believes, however, that such re-
finement should come in the first instance from those responsible for proposing rules.
Conscientious attention to the purposes of, and limitations on, the delegation should
prevent controversy of the sort that has plagued federal supervisory court rulemak-
ing in recent years.
Id.
26. H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 26 (1988). There was no Senate
Report for either the 1985 or 1988 bills.
27. See, eg., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) ("Congress has undoubted
power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that power by
delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the
statutes or constitution of the United States.") (footnote omitted). See generally LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 50 (2d ed. 1988) ("Consistent with constitu-
tional limitations, Congress clearly has authority to fix the rules of procedure, including rules
July 1993]
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Since Article III provides for the creation of the Supreme Court and for
"such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish, ' 28 Congress's power to create the lower federal courts has been
viewed as including the power to establish rules of procedure for such
courts. Moreover, Article I of the Constitution specifically mentions the
power of Congress "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court" 29 and authorizes Congress to make any laws necessary and
proper to execute its powers or other powers vested by the Constitution
in the U.S. government. 30
Coexistent with this general view that Congress has the power to
promulgate rules of procedure for the federal courts is the understanding
that, at least when Congress has not acted, the federal courts have the
authority to enact rules for their internal governance and for the process
or conduct of litigation before them.31 Of course, when Congress has not
acted, there are no separation of powers problems occasioned by the fed-
eral courts establishing rules of procedure because under Article III the
federal courts have this inherent power. 32
Congress's decision to delegate rulemaking powers to the Court is
within its constitutional powers. 33 The delegation is made to an appro-
of evidence, which article III courts must apply.") (footnote omitted); Jonathan M. Landers,
Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Pro-
cedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 849 (1974); Ralph U. Whitten, Separation of Powers
Restrictions on Judicial Rulemaking: A Case Study of Federal Rule 4, 40 ME. L. REv. 41, 48
(1988).
28. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
30. The Necessary and Proper Clause in Article I specifically provides Congress with the
power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The
power of Congress to regulate procedure of the federal courts under these constitutional provi-
sions has been recognized at least since 1825. See Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 53-54 (1825); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 21-22 (1825).
See also Willy v. Coastal Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1076, 1080 (1992).
31. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1, 24 (1985) (arguing there is no separation of powers objection to federal courts
adopting rules for internal operation or for control of litigation). Reflecting upon separation of
powers concerns regarding judicial rulemaking, Judge Weinstein has observed, "The rule-mak-
ing power is one of the most important examples of practical necessity dictating that a twilight
area be created where activities of the separate branches merge." JACK B. WEINSTEIN, RE-
FORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 54 (1977) (citation omitted).
32. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 345 (1959); Halstead, 23 U.S. at 60-64.
But see Whitten, supra note 27, at 54-60 (exploring limits on judicial rulemaking even when
Congress has not acted; concluding that certain areas, such as establishing additional lower
courts or altering its subject matter jurisdiction, would be beyond the scope of the Court's
constitutional rulemaking powers).
33. See generally Carole E. Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal Juris-
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priate body, and the legislation includes adequate standards for delega-
tion.34 Moreover, by retaining the power to review proposed Rules,
Congress has ensured that it will have the opportunity to review compli-
ance of the rulemaking body with the standards for delegation. 35
The House Committee's view, that Congress delegated only a part of
its rulemaking power, is arguably a more limited view than the Court's
interpretation of the original Rules Enabling Act in Sibbach and Hanna.
Both Sibbach and Hanna contain language suggesting the Court may
have viewed the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 as a full delegation to the
Court of Congress's constitutional powers to regulate procedural
rulemaking for the federal courts.36 Moreover, in those cases, the Court
extended the scope of Congress's power over procedural rulemaking be-
yond clearly procedural rules to include rules "which, though falling
within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are ration-
ally capable of classification as either."37 Apparently, the Court believed
that it would be constitutional for Congress to delegate fully its rulemak-
ing powers to the Court and that it had done so in the Rules Enabling
Act.38
Since the House Committee interpreted the 1988 Rules Enabling
Act as delegating to the Court a more circumscribed rulemaking power,
it is critical in understanding the Court's proper rulemaking role to as-
certain the authority of the House Committee and to determine the
weight to give its comments. 39 In the absence of other committee reports
diction, 28 STAN. L. REV. 395, 437-441 (1976) (concluding that delegation under the Rules
Enabling Act is constitutional because the Act provides standards for delegation and an appro-
priate delegatee, and retains a veto power for Congress).
34. Id. at 438.
35. Id.
36. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) ("TIhe new policy envisaged in
the enabling act of 1934 was that the whole field of court procedure be regulated in the interest
of speedy, fair and exact determination of the truth."). Several passages in Hanna suggest the
Court viewed the constitutional limitations and the delegation by Congress in the Rules En-
abling Act as coextensive. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470-74 (1965). The Court in
Hanna never attempted to distinguish constitutional limitations on rulemaking from limita-
tions in the Rules Enabling Act. See generally Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 5, at
1034; Landers, supra note 27, at 850-55.
37. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472.
38. See id at 471-72. See generally Landers, supra note 27, at 850-55. Decisions prior to
the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act suggest Congress could constitutionally delegate to
the courts its full authority to regulate court procedure. See, eg., Halstead, 23 U.S. at 61-62;
Wayman, 23 U.S. at 42-50.
39. As is discussed in more detail in Part II, see infra text and accompanying notes 156-
167, the weight to be given to legislative history is currently subject to substantial debate.
Justice Scalia and other textualists would ignore committee reports and other legislative his-
tory and would rely entirely upon the text of statutes. See, eg., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489
July 1993]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
or authoritative sources,40 the House Committee's view of restricted dele-
gation is the best available indication we have of the intent of Congress.
However, it is only the report of one committee. Unfortunately, deter-
mining the weight to give committee reports in statutory interpretation is
a perennially troubling issue.
To resolve this issue it is important to determine whether the Com-
mittee Report reflects an unusual agenda or an unrepresentative bias of
the Committee or its staff. Recent research suggests generally that the
likelihood of committee reports reflecting aberrational views is relatively
low. 41 Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest the House Committee
U.S. 87, 97 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). This view has been criti-
cized on many grounds, most importantly because it excludes useful information in under-
standing the intent of Congress. See, e.g., McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of
Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 738 (1992).
40. The Senate's discussion of the legislation suggests relatively meager attention to these
issues. Therefore, the House Committee Report apparently provides the only available insight
within Congress. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REc. S16,294 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of
Senator Heflin noting that there would be no committee report and that a more lengthy expla-
nation would be submitted later); id. at S16,300 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (analyzing bill provi-
sions as carrying forward scope of present law); see also Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note
10, at 1034-35 (describing Senate expectations as unclear concerning impact of 1988 congres-
sional activity on continued statutory language and giving strong weight to interpretation of
House Judiciary Committee).
41. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80
GEO. L.J. 523, 553-54 (1992) (concluding that the likelihood of "outlier" committees is not
great) (citing KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 105-50
(1991)); see also George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions"
The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative
History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 43 (noting that committee reports are "the most reliable and
persuasive element of legislative history" although they lose some persuasive force when the
report differs from the statutory text); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent
and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 444-52 (1988) (evaluating arguments against the use of
legislative history and concluding that the work of relevant committees should not be excluded
from consideration in interpreting statutes); Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observa-
tions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 385 (stating that the committee report is usually the "most useful"
aspect of legislative history and "represents the synthesis of the last meaningful discussion and
debate on the issue"); Arthur Stock, Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and
Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160, 174-75 (iden-
tifying congressional rules ensuring that committee reports fairly reflect viewpoint of commit-
tee). However, others have stated, often without support, that legislators are unfamiliar with
the content of Committee Reports. See, e.g., Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult
Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1014-15 (1992) [hereinafter Note, Re-
jecting Legislative History] (stating that "no one would claim that legislators who vote for a bill
necessarily have examined committee reports to see if they agree with the opinions in it," and
that "the most that can be said is that committee members would have endorsed these proposi-
tions if they had thought about them"). This is Justice Scalia's view. See, e.g., Blanchard, 489
U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Costello, supra, at
60-61 (summarizing Justice Scalia's approach to committee reports).
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was acting in a fashion disapproved by the Congress in this area.42 Some
caution must be exercised in according weight to the House Committee
Report, however, because the portion of the Report that discusses re-
stricting the scope of the Court's power to promulgate Rules occurs in
the context of a statutory amendment leaving intact the preexisting statu-
tory grant of rulemaking authority to the Court.43 Since the Court has
assumed full delegation of rulemaking powers in the 1934 Rules En-
abling Act, Congress should have expressed its intent to restrict those
powers through a change in the language of the 1988 Act rather than
only through comments in the House Committee Report.
Whether or not there are limitations on the scope of the delegated
rulemaking authority as suggested by the modem interpretation of the
Rules Enabling Acts described above, Congress has given the Court the
power within this sphere to promulgate rules of procedure that do not
modify any substantive rights. However, even within this procedural
sphere, the Supreme Court does not have unfettered discretion to pro-
mulgate the Rules. Congress has retained the power to consider and re-
ject Rules of which it does not approve. Thus, in the current framework,
in order for a rule or rule amendment to become effective by December 1,
the Court must transmit it to Congress by May 1.44 This schedule pro-
vides Congress with a seven-month period to study the proposal and re-
ject any part of which it disapproves. 45 Since Rules that become effective
42. The statements made during the House Committee hearings tend to support, not
contradict, the House Committee Report. See, eg., Rules Enabling Act: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 98th Cong., Ist and 2d Sess. 130-31, 135, 151 (1983 and 1984) (statement of Burt
Neuborne, Legal Director, American Civil Liberties Union). There were no Senate Hearings
and no Senate Committee Report. Thus there are no legislative materials discrediting the
House Committee Report. See generally Farber & Frickey, supra note 41, at 450 ("[W]hen a
fundamental aspect of legislative history, such as a committee report, is unimpeached by other
interpretive sources and is consistent with the apparent coherent legislative equilibrium, it
should be an important, though not conclusive, interpretive source.").
43. Cf Costello, supra note 41, at 66-68 (cautioning against reliance on Committee Re-
port when detailed committee language is not tied to statute).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988). The 1934 Rules Enabling Act did not require reporting
rules for actions at law to Congress. Reporting to Congress was required, however, for rules
uniting procedures for cases in equity with those for actions at law. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub.
L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064. See generally Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 5, at
1026, 1069-77 (suggesting that for political reasons, Chief Justice Taft inserted language in a
proposed bill requiring congressional notification of united rules for law and equity). As the
Rules Enabling Act language has evolved, aspects of this reporting process have changed. See,
e.g., Act of May 10, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-510, § 2, 64 Stat. 158 (allowing Court to report to
Congress no later than the first of May, with effectiveness 90 days after submission, unless
objected to by Congress). The reporting duty is discussed in more detail in Burbank, Rules
Enabling Act, supra note 5, at 1075-77 n.268.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988). Interestingly, § 2074 does not explicitly authorize Con-
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supersede existing conflicting statutory provisions under the Supersession
Clause,46 reporting to Congress is particularly important when proposed
Rules differ from, and will supersede, existing statutory provisions. 47 Re-
porting is required for all proposed Rules, however, whether or not they
will supersede existing statutes. 48
In understanding the scope of the Court's rulemaking powers, the
provision in the Rules Enabling Act known as the Supersession Clause is
particularly significant because of its implications for the allocation of
power between the Court and Congress and also because of the rulemak-
ing controversy the clause has engendered. The Supersession Clause was
originally incorporated in the 1934 Rules Enabling Act49 in order to as-
sure that a variety of existing procedural statutes would be replaced by
gress to reject any proposed rules submitted to it by the Court. Instead, it provides, "Such rule
shall take effect no earlier than December I of the year in which such rule is so transmitted
unless otherwise provided by law." Id. According to the House Committee on the Judiciary,
this provision is constitutional under INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935 n.9 (1983). 1985
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 27 & n.33. See also PAUL BATOR ET AL., THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 764 (3d ed. 1988) (concluding that this provision of the
Rules Enabling Act is constitutional under Chadha).
With respect to rules affecting evidentiary privileges, explicit approval in an Act of Con-
gress is required. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (1988). This provision reflects the great debate in the
1970s concerning the propriety of the Court's promulgation of the proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, particularly rules affecting evidentiary privileges, pursuant to its rulemaking author-
ity under the 1934 Rules Enabling Act. In view of Chadha, the 1988 Act eliminated the one-
house veto of proposed changes to rules that affect privileges. 1985 HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 20, at 27.
See infra notes 63-95 and accompanying text for discussion of Congress's response to
proposed Rules.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988), known as the Supersession Clause, provides, "All laws in
conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect."
47. See generally Carrington, Substance and Procedure, supra note 10, at 322-26 (arguing
for retention of Supersession Clause). Carrington argues that congressional review of proposed
rules should concern only those rules that conflict with existing statutes, on the grounds that
unconstrained review of all rule proposals would repoliticize the rulemaking process. Id. at
322-23. He favors retention of the supersession provision in part because it affords increased
importance to judicial rulemaking, but warns that supersession is not intended when a federal
statute is arguably substantive. Id. at 324-25. But see Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 10,
at 1036-46 (arguing against retention of Supersession Clause, criticizing Carrington's position
on numerous grounds, and noting that there is no historic linkage between the reporting to
Congress provision and the supersession provision).
48. Cf Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 10, at 1043 (stating that reporting to Con-
gress would be important absent a supersession clause in order to ensure compliance with
limitations on Rules affecting substantive rights); A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 42 (1958) (advocating legislative review over rulemaking when "important
decisions of public policy are necessarily involved").
49. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064, provided that after the Rules
took effect, "all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect."
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the new Rules and that there would be no conflict with the old Conform-
ity Act.50 Congress has recently debated the wisdom of and necessity for
maintaining the provision. In 1985, the House Committee on the Judici-
ary determined there was no longer a need for supersession because pro-
cedural statutes that were in conflict with the Rules had been eliminated
and because Congress legislates today in light of the Rules.51 Further-
more, the Committee was concerned that the Supersession Clause might
violate the separation of powers principles underlying INS i. Chadha,5 2
which required conformity with Article I in the repeal of statutes.5 3
However, despite the House's adoption of the House Committee's propo-
sal to eliminate the Supersession Clause,54 the Senate refused to eliminate
the Clause.55 The Senate apparently believed the Clause "has worked
well since its creation in 1934. It provides a sense of stability and uni-
formity to the Federal Rules of Procedure. '5 6 The House receded,57 at
least in part relying on the promise of the Chief Justice to act carefully
50. See 1985 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 16 (citing Burbank, Rules Enabling Act,
supra note 5, at 1050-54). The Conformity Act, Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197,
repealed by the 1934 Rules Enabling Act, required that a district court follow the procedure of
the state in which it was located in cases at common law.
51. 1985 HoUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 16-17.
52. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
53. 1985 House REPORT, supra note 20, at 17, 23. The Committee did not conclude that
Chadha mandated elimination of the Supersession Clause. Instead, it argued that Chadha
placed a "constitutional cloud" over the Clause. Id at 17. The Committee also stated,
"Chadha has raised again the question whether general supersession provisions are constitu-
tional. On one view, the Supreme Court purports to authorize the repeal of a federal statute by
a process other than that prescribed by Article I of the Constitution." Id at 23. However, the
Committee continued, "The Committee does not believe that, whatever the constitutional sta-
tus of general supersession provisions, Chadha prevents Congress from specifically identifying
statutory provisions that may be superseded by rules promulgated pursuant to a valid delega-
tion." Id
54. 134 CONG. REc. H10,440 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (remarks of Representative Kas-
tenmeier). See 1985 HousE REPORT, supra note 20, at 1, 16-17, 22-23; H.R. REP. No. 889,
100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 28-29 (1988). The 1988 bill passed by the House would have
precluded the Rules from superseding statutes unless the particular statute made an amend-
ment to the Rules. See H.R. REP. No. 889, at 29.
55. 134 CONG. REc. S16,296 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (remarks of Senator Heflin).
56. Id.
57. 134 CONG. REc. H10,440 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (remarks of Representative Kas-
tenmeier). Representative Kastenmeier characterized repeal of the Supersession Clause as
"the single most important reform contained in the House-passed bill." Id He viewed the
"authority to abrogate congressional prerogatives... [as] unwise and potentially unconstitu-
tional. I am disappointed that the Senate has chosen to perpetuate a conflict between the
branches that is unnecessary." Id (footnote omitted).
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when proposed Rules might supersede statutes, 58 and left the Superses-
sion Clause in the current statute. 59
The resolution of the supersession debate makes it unlikely that the
Court would precipitously propose amendments to Rules that would su-
persede statutes. 6° Retention of supersession authority is important,
however, when strong policy reasons favor judicial rulemaking solutions
to procedural problems. For example, adopting a procedural Rule that
supersedes a statute may be particularly desirable when circumstances
have changed since an initial congressional enactment, or when a Rule
change will enhance a conflicting congressional policy. 61 Retaining the
Supersession Clause facilitates rulemakers' consideration of procedural
rules that may conflict with existing statutes, and thus facilitates a broad
scope for modem judicial rulemaking.62
58. Representative Kastenmeier expressed the hope that the Judicial Conference and the
Supreme Court would avoid promulgating rules on substantive matters and would indicate in
advisory committee notes any laws that would be superseded by a proposed rule. Id. He also
attached to his remarks a letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist to Chairman Rodino of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, in which Justice Rehnquist promised that the Judicial
Conference and its committees would be "circumspect in superseding procedural statutes. At
the very least, we will undertake to identify such situations when they arise so that the Con-
gress will have every opportunity to examine these instances on the merits as part of your
review." Id. at H10,441.
59. Technically, Chadha invalidated the one-House veto of actions of the Attorney Gen-
eral under a statutory delegation of authority. 462 U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983). The 1988 Rules
Enabling Act eliminated the one-House veto aspect that had been applicable to the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
102 Stat. 4642, 4650 (1988) (repealing former 28 U.S.C. § 2076). The Supersession Clause
does not involve the veto provisions of Chadha, but does raise questions of separation of pow-
ers between the judicial and legislative branches and questions of whether rules that in effect
repeal statutes must be subject to the Article I requirements of passage by both Houses and
presentment to the President. These questions will be faced if and when a new rule amend-
ment effects a repeal of an existing statute.
60. But see Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 10, at 1037-41 (criticizing reliance on
Chief Justice Rehnquist's promise in light of past actions of rulemakers that disregarded possi-
ble conflicts of Rules with statutes).
61. See Whitten, supra note 27, at 60-66. Professor Whitten describes a number of fac-
tors that should be considered in evaluating whether a Rule should supersede a conflicting
statute. These factors include the detail with which Congress has regulated a procedural area,
how long Congress has regulated, the apparent importance of the congressional policy, the
timing and purpose of the delegation of rulemaking power vis-a-vis the statutory regulation,
the extent to which the Rules will have an impact on the statute, and the extent to which the
Rules will further other important statutory policies. Id. His basic thesis is that the Court's
rulemaking powers under the Rules Enabling Act are limited by separation of powers princi-
ples, even when Rules are purely procedural, if Congress has occupied the particular field. Id.
at 115.
62. Whitten, supra note 27, at 66-70 (stating that "if Congress may not authorize the
Supreme Court to make rules that supersede statutes, the entire modern Court rulemaking
enterprise is jeopardized," id. at 66, and concluding that the better view is that "supersession
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The rulemaking structure established by the 1934 Rules Enabling
Act is complicated. Although Congress has delegated the procedural
rulemaking function to the Court subject to limited congressional over-
sight, developments in the 1980s, notably the legislative history accompa-
nying the 1988 statute, demonstrate a possibly more circumscribed
delegation of rulemaking. The extent of Congress's actual involvement
in supervising its delegation of rulemaking power is explored in the fol-
lowing section.
(2) Congress's Involvement in Rulemaking
Congress had acquiesced in all of the Court's proposals for the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure 63 prior to 1973, when it suspended the ef-
fectiveness of the Supreme Court's proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
and certain related Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 Since 1973, how-
ever, Congress has occasionally acted to delay the implementation of
proposed Rules, to disapprove certain proposed Rules, or to enact its
own variations of Rules. 65 These situations are important to review, for
they demonstrate a new willingness on the part of Congress to become
involved in the rulemaking process in particular instances.
provisions are not invalid per se," id. at 68.) But see Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 10,
at 1036-46 (criticizing retention of Supersession Clause in 1988 legislation on a number of
grounds and disagreeing with efforts to limit supersession to procedural statutes).
63. See generally 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1001, at 6-7 (2d ed. 1987) (describing Congress's policy of restraint as "a
tribute to the effectiveness of judicial rulemaking and a reflection of Congress' laudable policy
of discouraging piecemeal alterations of existing procedural rules"). Moreover, Congress had
not enacted amendments to or repeals of any rules, save one narrow provision regarding plead-
ing in patent litigation. Id at 6-7 & n.20. See also Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to
Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substan-
tive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2067, 2124 (1989) [hereinafter Carrington,
Making Rules] ("More frequently, Congress has simply acquiesced in the promulgation of
Civil Rules amendments. This passivity partly reflects a benevolent Congressional self-re-
straint; Congress has the unquestioned power to dissolve not only the rulemaking apparatus,
but also the federal courts themselves.").
64. Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (an Act "[t]o promote the
separation of constitutional powers by suspending the effectiveness of the Rules of Evidence
... and the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"). Certain of the proposed
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were also suspended by Congress, but
were later approved by Congress and enacted into law. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-
595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1949. These amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
related to the Federal Rules of Evidence; although Congress rewrote key provisions of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, it simply approved in 1975 the Court's proposed amendments to
the relevant Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id
65. See generally 1985 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 8-9 n.20 (collecting Public Laws
affecting rules of procedure and evidence).
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In 1980 Congress provided for certain prevailing parties to recover
attorney's fees and other expenses against the United States govern-
ment. 6 At the same time, Congress repealed Rule 37(f), which had pro-
hibited an award of fees or expenses against the United States for
discovery abuses, except to the extent permitted by statute. 67 According
to the relevant Committee Reports, "This change reflects the belief that
the United States should be liable for fees the same as other parties when
it abuses discovery. '68
In 1982 Congress first delayed the effective date of proposed amend-
ments to Rule 4,69 instead enacting its own version in 1983 as a statutory
amendment to Rule 4.70 This was the first time that Congress had di-
rectly amended a Federal Rule.71 The amendment was the result of a
dispute between Congress and the Court concerning the proper mecha-
nism for shifting the burden of service of process from federal marshals
to parties and counsel. Although Congress agreed with the Court that
the usual mechanism for service of process should be shifted from per-
sonal service by federal marshals to service by mail, Congress viewed the
Court's proposed amendment as unsatisfactory in three important
66. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325-30 (1980)
(part of the Small Business Export Expansion Act of 1980). See generally H.R. REP. No.
1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1980) (describing purposes of Equal Access to Justice Act); S.
REP. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979) (same). These provisions are now codified in 28
U.S.C. § 2412 (1988).
67. Equal Access to Justice Act § 205. Rule 37(f) had provided, "Except to the extent
permitted by statute, expenses and fees may not be awarded against the United States under
this rule."
68. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980); S. REP. No. 253, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 22 (1979); see also S. REP. No. 253, at 4. In 1979 the Judicial Conference's Standing
Committee excluded a rule proposed by the Advisory Committee (Rule 37(h)) that would have
authorized judges to notify the Attorney General or other federal officers if a federal officer or
attorney failed to cooperate in good faith with discovery. 80 F.R.D. 323, 347-48 (1979). See
WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 26 n.61
(1981). Apparently viewing this provision as inappropriately included in the rule, the standing
committee instead included it in the advisory committee notes to Rule 37. 85 F.R.D. 521, 532-
34 (Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments 1979). This note was approved by
the Judicial Conference and the Court, was submitted to Congress by the Court on April 29,
1980, and became effective August 1, 1980. See 446 U.S. 997 (1980).
69. Act of Aug. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-227, 96 Stat. 246. The President "reluctantly"
signed this bill, expressing concern that "the United States Marshals Service needs prompt
relief from the burden of serving process for private parties in civil actions, relief these amend-
ments would provide." President's Statement on Signing H.R. 6663 into Law, 18 WEEKLY
COMP. PRs. Doc. 982 (Aug. 2, 1982). He was confident, however, that Congress would act
promptly to provide a comprehensive solution. Id.
70. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96
Stat. 2527 (1983).
71. See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 63, § 1061, at 220.
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ways, 72 and enacted its own Rule 4 amendment to resolve these
problems.73
Congress acted on its own initiative and not in response to any
Court proposal when it enacted an amendment to Rule 35 in 1988. The
amendment added a provision allowing psychologists to perform mental
examinations of parties. 74 Congress's amending of the rule is somewhat
troubling. Apparently, Congress wanted to allow licensed or certified
psychologists to examine mentally diseased criminal offenders pursuant
to an analogous criminal statute.75 The House analysis of the bill amend-
ing the criminal statute noted the parallel question of the types of exam-
iners qualified in a civil proceeding under Rule 35, but concluded that a
change to the language of Rule 35 should be undertaken according to the
normal rulemaking process, rather than by an enactment of Congress. 76
The Senate, however, supported the inclusion of a statutory amendment
to Rule 35 that allowed psychologists to perform mental examinations in
civil cases, 77 and the House ultimately accepted this statutory change.78
72. H.R. REP. No. 662, 97 Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1982). The House Judiciary Committee
observed that the Court's formulation of the amendment to Rule 4(c)(2)(B) might have failed
to achieve the goal of relieving marshals from their service of process duties, that the Court's
proposed Rule 4(d) amendment requiring service by certified or registered mail could result in
unfair default judgments, and that the proposed Court version of the new Rule 4(j), which
required dismissal if service was not made within 120 days, contained ambiguities that might
necessitate litigation to resolve. Id
73. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982. The legislative history
describes Congress's amendments as supported by both the Department of Justice and the
Judicial Conference. 128 CONG. REc. H30, 931-36 (Dec. 15, 1982) (statement of Representa-
tive Edwards); id at H30, 936-37 (statement of Representative McClory).
74. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, tit. VII, § 7047(b), 102 Stat.
4401 (1988).
75. See 133 CONG. REc. H5336 (daily ed. June 22, 1987) (discussing H.R. 2182, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 142 (1987)).
76. Id ("In deference to the Rules Enabling Acts, no change is being made to Rule
35(a).... It would be appropriate for the Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules to address whether Rule 35(a) should be amended to include licensed or certified
psychologists.").,
77. 134 CONG. Ruc. S15,793 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1988) (Senate amendment to H.R. 5210,
100th Cong., 2d Sss. § 2637 (1988)); 134 CONG. REc. S8176 (daily ed. June 17, 1988) (S.
2485, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 137 (1988)).
78. See 134 CONG. REc. H1l,254 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988). While the House Judiciary
Committee still "believes that, as a general rule, changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure ought ordinarily to be made through the process established by the Rules Enabling Act,"
id, the amendment to Rule 35 was viewed as consistent with other law. In addition to being
consistent with the amendment to the criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b) (1988), the amend-
ment was believed to make Rule 35 coordinate with FED. R. EVID. 702, which allowed a
psychologist to testify at trial as an expert concerning a party's mental state. 134 CONG. REC.
HI1,254 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988).
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Thus, the amendment to Rule 35 became part of the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988.
The 1988 Anti-Drug statute was also troubling because it incorpo-
rated in statutory form two other changes to unrelated rules that had
already been proposed by the Supreme Court and were awaiting auto-
matic enactment. The Supreme Court had transmitted two technical
changes to Rules 17 and 71A to Congress in April 1988. 79 Instead of
simply allowing these technical amendments to become effective auto-
matically, Congress included these technical corrections in the unrelated
1988 Anti-Drug statute.8 There was no valid reason for these two tech-
nical changes to be enacted in statutory form, especially since the statute
was unrelated to the substance of the rules. There is no meaningful dis-
tinction between these Rules and the vast bulk of the Rules that are not
incorporated in statutes and become effective simply through the opera-
tion of the Rules Enabling Act.
In 1991 Congress acted to cure technical errors that had been mis-
takenly embedded in the 1991 Supreme Court proposals for amending
the Federal Rules. These errors would have become part of the Federal
Rules had Congress not acted.81 The rulemakers requested that Con-
gress take this action in order to avoid confusion of litigants and law-
yers.82 This scenario illustrates cooperation between the judicial and
legislative branches in rulemaking.8 3
79. 485 U.S. 1044, 1044-45 (1988). The technical changes involved the amendment of
Rule 17(a) to assure gender neutrality and the amendment of Rule 71A(e) to cure a punctua-
tion error.
80. This enactment of technical changes to Rules (having to do with gender neutrality
and placement of an apostrophe) by statute seems completely misplaced. This might be attrib-
utable to the Supreme Court's failure to transmit the technical corrections recommended by
the Advisory Committee in its submission to Congress. See 133 CONG. REC. H5331 (daily ed.
June 22, 1987) (H.R. 2182, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 144, 145 (1987)). This provision was
ultimately incorporated into the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7049,
7050, 102 Stat. 4181, 4401, which, ironically, Congress passed the day before passage of the
1988 Rules Enabling Act.
81. Act of Dec. 9, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-198, § 11, 105 Stat. 1623, 1626-27. The
Supreme Court's proposed amendments to the Federal Rules, submitted to Congress on April
30, 1991, 111 S. Ct. 813 (1991), included a reference to a rule that did not exist and had not
been submitted to Congress. It also included inappropriate forms in the Appendix of Forms.
Both errors occurred when the Court decided not to transmit to Congress certain other recom-
mendations from the Judicial Conference because of objections from the State Department, but
failed to edit related rules and forms. See H.R. REP. No. 322, 102 Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 9-10, 23-
24 (1991).
82. Id. at 23-24 (letter from L. Ralph Mecham, Director of the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts, to Congress requesting that Congress enact a statute to cure drafting
problems involved in amendments to the Federal Rules transmitted by the Court to Congress
in 1991).
83. The 1991 legislation also included an amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2107 designed to
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Apart from the cooperative intervention of Congress in 1991, since
1975 Congress's involvement in the process of amending Rules has been
troubling. In the situations involving Rule 35 and Rule 37(f), Congress
acted on its own, without allowing consideration through the usual
rulemaking process of the desirability of the specific amendments. In
another instance, when Congress substituted its own proposal in place of
the Court's amendments to Rule 4, Congress made its own assessment of
a basically procedural problem. In these three instances, Congress did
not adequately interact with the Court or with the normal rulemaking
process.
Of the three problematic amendments, the statutory amendment of
Rule 35 to include mental examinations by psychologists is particularly
questionable. This amendment appears to be a political response to the
pressures of a discrete interest group rather than a carefully crafted re-
sponse to procedural inadequacies of the prior Rule.3 4 This amendment
unnecessarily and improperly propelled the legislative branch into a new
role as a "quick fix" for drawbacks of the Rules perceived by interested
persons or groups. Given the structure established for Rules changes, a
structure established by Congress itself, there was no justification for
Congress's unilateral enactment of this amendment.
The repeal of Rule 37(f), which eliminated the United States' immu-
nity from monetary sanctions for discovery abuse, was a more suitable
topic for congressional action. Congress did not appear to be reacting to
special interest groups, and the United States' potential liability for mon-
etary sanctions is an area of concern to Congress, which is responsible for
raising funds for government expenditures. It is, therefore, desirable that
any provision resulting in the possibility of direct imposition of fees or
expenses against the United States be the result of explicit congressional
action and presidential approval.8 5 However, a preferable approach
coordinate the statute with then-pending amendments to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appel-
late Procedure concerning extension of time to file notices of appeal. See id. at 5-6, 10. This is
another illustration of the possible cooperation between the two branches in the procedural
arena.
84. See Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE
161, 165 (1991) [hereinafter Carrington, New Order] (stating that Rule 35 was amended di-
rectly by Congress because of personal interest of a particular Senator).
85. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) ("It is axiomatic that the
United States cannot be sued without its consent .... "); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S.
15, 30 (1953) ("[N]o action lies against the United States unless the legislature has authorized
it."); United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1940) ("[W]ithout specific statutory con-
sent, no suit may be brought against the United States."). See generally 14 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3654, at 191 & n.5 (2d ed. 1985)
(discussing limits on suits against the United States).
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would have involved some consultation with the bodies involved in the
usual rulemaking process prior to the enactment of the statute to take
advantage of their special expertise when rules impacting procedural
considerations are involved.86 Moreover, a statutory provision explicitly
authorizing imposition of fees would have avoided ambiguity, clarified
authority, and been more desirable than simply repealing a Federal
Rule.87
In the third of these problematic congressional amendments, Con-
gress's role in rejecting the Court's proposed amendments to Rule 4 and
enacting its own variation appears, at least on first analysis, to be trouble-
some because Congress seemed to be involving itself in quintessentially
procedural issues best left to the rulemakers. Under this view, if Con-
gress were troubled by the Court's proposed amendments, it should have
identified its concerns and remanded the proposal to the Advisory Com-
mittee for redrafting.
Upon full examination, however, Congress's involvement appears
more appropriate. The rulemakers' proposed revision of the Rule, which
attempted to address problems posed by the old formulation of the Rule,
had not been widely circulated.88 Congress responded to criticisms
lodged against the proposed amendments89 first by delaying the effective
86. A review of the hearings on the legislation that repealed Rule 37(f) reveals no discus-
sion concerning the repeal of the Rule and no testimony by those involved in the rulemaking
process. Exchanges with the representative of the Judicial Conference did not involve Rule
37(f). See Equal Access to Courts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1978) (testimony of
Carl B. Rubin, U.S. District Court Judge, Southern District of Ohio, who represented the
Judicial Conference of the United States, discussing general effects on federal court system and
procedures for attorney's fees payments).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988), which codifies much of the 1980 statute authorizing fees for
certain prevailing parties against the government, does not include a specific reference to
awards of expenses for discovery abuse.
88. See, e.g., David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary on Amendment of Federal Rule 4
(Eff. Feb. 26, 1983) with Special Statute of Limitations Precautions, 96 F.R.D. 81, 91-92 (1983)
(stating that promulgation of Rule 4 surprised practitioners and academics due to sparse circu-
lation of information about the proposed rule, and noting that widespread concern about the
new rule led to Congress's postponement of the effective date of the proposal). The prelimi-
nary draft of the proposed amendment to the Rule was circulated by the Advisory Committee
in September 1981, but the Rule was amended substantially thereafter by the Advisory Com-
mittee and proceeded quickly through the rulemaking tiers. See H. R. Doc. No. 173, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in 96 F.R.D. 123 (1983) (letter from Chief Justice Burger to
Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill transmitting proposed amendments to Rules with accompanying
materials, including reports from Standing Committee and Advisory Committee). See gener-
ally Kent Sinclair, Service of Process: Rethinking the Theory and Procedure of Serving Process
Under Federal Rule 4(c), 73 VA. L. REv. 1183, 1202-04 (1987) (describing rulemaking process
concerning Rule 4).
89. See Siegel, supra note 88, at 91-92 (describing some problems with the Court's pro-
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date of the Court's proposal. Congress subsequently enacted its own ver-
sion, but only after consulting with interested groups and individuals and
after securing the approval of representatives of the Judicial Conference
and the Justice Department. 90 Some might argue this response is exactly
what was envisioned in the Rules Enabling Act's provisions that require
notice to Congress and a hiatus period before the Rules amendments be-
come effective. However, it should be noted that even the version en-
acted by Congress suffers from substantial problems of interpretation.
These might have been cured by a remand back to the rulemakers and
full reconsideration through public advisory committee meetings. 91
The events of the last decade suggest that Congress is moving to
reclaim some degree of involvement in the rulemaking process, notwith-
standing the continued broad delegation of rulemaking power to the
Court. To the extent that Congress is supervising its delegation of
rulemaking powers to the Court, this new involvement has some benefit.
Indeed, this is perhaps the way a proper delegation of authority should
operate. However, the scattershot aspects of Congress's activity, exem-
plified particularly by its involvement in amending Rule 35, suggest the
occurrence of something more distressing: Congress is reacting on occa-
sion to isolated pressures and is not acting with a vision of the procedural
system as a whole.92 While any individual change, like the change to
posed amendment of Rule 4 as presented to Congress). Professor Siegel complains that the
Court's proposed changes to Rule 4 were not generally available, or even available to inter-
ested attorneys, before their submission to Congress. Iad at 916. This lack of availability ne-
cessitated that constructive criticism of the Court's proposal be presented in the first instance
to Congress. See also Sinclair, supra note 88, at 1197-1204 (discussing the origins and flawed
operation of Rule 4(c)). Sinclair's study suggests that in 1981 Chief Justice Burger cooperated
with the Justice Department and others to propose legislation to Congress designed to reduce
the process-serving role of marshals and later pressured the rulemaking committees to act
speedily to amend Rule 4. IM. at 1201-02. Paul Carrington's alternative explanation is that the
congressional action was the result of successful lobbying by the National Association of Pro-
cess Servers. Carrington, New Order, supra note 84, at 164.
90. 128 CONG. REc. H30, 931-37 (Dec. 15, 1982) (statements of Representatives Ed-
wards and McClory).
91. Although speedy implementation of a change from service by marshals was desired,
see supra note 69, the procedural ambiguities lurking in the area might have warranted some
additional time for reviewing Congress's proposal. Some of the problems with the framework
enacted by Congress are described in Siegel, supra note 88. See also Sinclair, supra note 88, at
1212-88 (criticizing the structure and operation of Rule 4).
92. See Carrington, New Order, supra note 84, at 162-63; Carrington, Substance and Pro-
cedure, supra note 10, at 282. Paul Carrington asserts that courts should engage in rulemaking
because "complex technical issues of judicial practice cannot sustain attention through the
political process. ... [I]f such issues are to receive thoughtful attention at all, such attention
must come from outside the usual channels of democratic politics." Carrington, Substance
and Procedure, supra note 10, at 282. Carrington develops a series of principles that he be-
lieves are furthered by judicial rulemaking: the depoliticization of judicial procedure, the de-
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Rule 35, may itself be relatively insignificant when viewed independently,
the potential exists for a series of changes with fundamental, although
perhaps unintended, effects on the entire procedural system.
It should also be noted that the recent actions of Congress interject-
ing itself in the rulemaking process have primarily involved discrete pro-
cedural issues rather than issues that have a significant substantive
effect. 93 A principal reason for delegation of rulemaking power to the
judicial branch is its relative expertise in procedural matters.94 Even the
current opinion expressed in Congress urging a congressional role in
rulemaking has focused upon the need for legislative input when substan-
tive policies are at stake.95 Thus, Congress's rulemaking activity of the
last decade raises concerns about the effectiveness of the delegation to the
judicial branch of rulemaking authority and about the propriety of con-
gressional involvement in procedural matters.
The 1988 revision of the Rules Enabling Act and its accompanying
Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary calling for a circum-
scribed judicial role in rulemaking, coupled with Congress's involvement
in the statutory amendments to the Rules in the 1980s, demonstrates a
new activism on the part of Congress. Such activism by Congress estab-
velopment of general rules that apply regardless of substantive issues, and flexibility in drafting
to allow trial judges discretion in applying the Rules to a specific case. Id. at 301-07. See also
Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 63, at 2079-85 (developing the principles of generalism
and flexibility). Carrington also suggests that if a proposed rule generates substantial political
conflict, this might be a signal for the Court to step back as rulemaker and let Congress con-
sider the views of competing interest groups. Id. at 2086. However, he urges Congress to act
cautiously. Id. See generally Charles E. Clark, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal
Rule-Making, 46 JUDICATURE 250, 254 (1963) (commending success of rulemakers in avoid-
ing congressional tinkering with Rules).
93. An exception is the repeal of Rule 37(f) as part of Congress's effort to make the
government as accountable as private parties in litigation. See supra text accompanying notes
66-68.
94. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 31, at 94-95 (discussing the expertise of the courts in
rulemaking and providing guidelines for congressional review that focus on rules with substan-
tive effects); Jack. H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contempo-
rary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 673, 673-74 (1975) (describing Supreme Court's role in
rulemaking as spectacular until it began to act simply as a conduit, and arguing that the legis-
lative process is unsuited to procedural reform); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Undemocratic Legis-
lation, 87 YALE L.J. 1284, 1292-94 (1978) (reviewing WEINSTEIN, supra note 31, and
comparing the success of judicial rulemaking with congressional mishandling of rulemaking in
connection with the Federal Rules of Evidence).
95. This view has also been suggested by earlier commentators. See, e.g, WEINSTEIN,
supra note 31, at 94 (rules with substantive effect should be more carefully reviewed by Con-
gress than purely procedural rules); Charles A. Wright, Book Review, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 652,
654 (1978) (reviewing WEINSTEIN, supra note 31, and suggesting Congress rather than
rulemakers propose Rules with "important side effects on substantive rights").
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lishes the modem background for examination of the Court's role in the
lishes the modem background for examination of the Court's role in the
promulgation and interpretation of the Rules.
B. The Role of the Judicial Branch in the Promulgation of the Rules
Under the Rules Enabling Act, the Supreme Court itself has the
power to prescribe the Federal Rules, subject to both the acquiescence of
Congress and the other constraints discussed thus far.9 6 However, rather
than trying to create Rules independently, the Court has always relied
upon a series of Advisory Committees to draft proposed Rules. As part
of its recent attention to rulemaking, Congress has enacted legislation
allocating roles and responsibilities in the rulemaking process. Despite
this effort to clarify roles in rulemaking, the Supreme Court's actual role
in rulemaking still involves some debate, both inside and outside of the
Court.
Congress established the basic framework for the modem rulemak-
ing process in 1958, when it imposed on the Judicial Conference97 the
duty to study continuously the Federal Rules and to recommend propos-
als for addition and amendment to the Supreme Court.98 The Supreme
Court retained responsibility for recommending proposed Rules to Con-
gress and was not required to embrace the proposals of the Judicial Con-
ference. 99 Both the Court °° and Congress T10 sought the continuous
involvement of the Judicial Conference because of the need for constant
96. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988).
97. The Judicial Conference is composed of the Chief Justice, the chief judge of each
judicial circuit, the chief judge of the Court of International Trade, and a district judge from
each judicial circuit who is chosen by the district and circuit judges in the circuit. 28 U.S.C.
§ 331 (1988). It must meet at least annually. Id
98. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988) (part of Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (1958)). In addition
to "continuous study," this provision requires:
Such changes in and additions to those rules as the Conference may deem desirable
to promote simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, the just determination
of litigation, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay shall be recom-
mended by the Conference from time to time to the Supreme Court for its considera-
tion and adoption, modification or rejection, in accordance with law.
Id
99. See S. REP. No. 1744, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3023, 3024; H.R. REP. No. 1670, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958).
100. See, eg., H.R. REP. No. 1670, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958) (letter of Warren Olney
III, Director of Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to Sam Rayburn, Speaker of
the House, stating that continuous study of the Rules was essential, but impractical for the
Supreme Court to do so without assistance and that the Chief Justice and the Judicial Confer-
ence sought enactment of the legislation).
101. See id. at 2 (stating that "the Court by itself has neither the organization nor the
personnel required for effective rulemaking"); see also S. REP. No. 1744, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3023-24.
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evaluation of the Rules and the inability of the Court to engage in effec-
tive, independent rulemaking.
In the 1988 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Con-
gress specified procedures for the Judicial Conference and other bodies
involved in recommending and considering proposed rules. 10 2 Many of
these procedures had evolved since 1958, when the Judicial Conference
undertook its duty to review and recommend proposed modifications of
the Rules. 103
The legislation enacted in 1988 directs the Judicial Conference to
appoint a standing committee on rules of practice, procedure, and evi-
dence. This standing committee is required to review recommendations
of all other committees on rules created by the Judicial Conference,1 4
including the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. Thus, under the cur-
rent framework, after the proposed changes in the Federal Rules are
drafted by the Advisory Committee, they are reviewed first by the Stand-
ing Committee, then by the Judicial Conference, and finally by the
Supreme Court before being submitted to Congress.105
The 1988 legislation mandates that the committees appointed by the
Judicial Conference open their meetings to the interested public and hold
102. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4649 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1988)). The provi-
sions pertaining to the Federal Rules process and authority were also entitled the "Rules En-
abling Act." Id. tit. IV.
103. See generally 1985 HousE REPORT, supra note 20, at 9-11 (describing rulemaking
framework existing in 1985); BROWN, supra note 68 (describing rulemaking framework and
discussing possible improvements).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (1988). Although just recently required pursuant to statute, this
framework has been followed since 1958. See generally Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to
Federal Court Rulemaking Procedure, 22 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 323, 324-33 (1991) (describing
the historical and current mechanisms for development of Rules). See also Carrington, Mak-
ing Rules, supra note 63, at 2119-24 (describing in some detail how the modern Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules operates). Baker is a member of the Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference, and Carrington is the Reporter for the
Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules. The current framework involves the Standing Com-
mittee on Rules reviewing recommendations by the Civil Rules Committee. Recommenda-
tions of the Standing Committee are forwarded to the Judicial Conference and then to the
Supreme Court. According to Carrington, "The Supreme Court has promulgated every rule
change recommended to it by the Civil Rules Committee and the Judicial Conference,
although not always without dissent." Id. at 2122. In 1990, however, the Court did not trans-
mit amendments to Rule 4 and other related provisions that had been suggested by the Judicial
Conference. H.R. REP. No. 322, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1991). A letter from L. Ralph
Mecham, Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, to Representative William J.
Hughes suggested that the Court omitted proposed amendments after concern expressed from
Department of State regarding extraterritorial aspects. Id at 23-24.
105. See generally 1985 HousE REPORT, supra note 20, at 9-11 (describing framework
prior to 1985); id. at 23-26 (describing 1988 legislation that changed certain aspects of
framework).
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them only after adequate notice.106 Notice and openness were added to
insure widespread opportunity for public participation in'the rulemaking
process, which was perceived to have been lacking in the past.10 7 The
statute also provides-that every committee "shall consist of members of
the bench and the professional bar, and trial and appellate judges." 108
This is a somewhat awkwardly framed provision aimed at assuring
broader participation in the rulemaking process. 109
In order to facilitate clear and intelligent rule proposals, the legisla-
tion also mandates that any "body" making a recommendation for a pro-
posed rule must supply both an explanation of the rule, and of the
majority and minority views. 1 0 This full reporting provision presumedly
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)(1), (2) (1988). These provisions permit meetings to be closed,
but only if closure is "in the public interest" and if the reason for closure is stated publicly. 28
U.S.C. § 2073(c)(1) (1988). The statute also requires that the Judicial Conference publish the
procedures for consideration of proposed Rules. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(1) (1988). The Judicial
Conference had begun doing so in 1983. See 98 F.R.D. 347, 347-51 (1983); 110 S. Ct. 242,
24247 (1989).
107. Some movement towards openness and more public participation had already been
undertaken by the Judicial Conference before the 1988 legislation. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No.
889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 27-28 (1988) (recognizing that the Judicial Conference had
broadened participation in the rulemaking process but concluding that further action was re-
quired to assure openness); 1985 House REPORT, supra note 20, at 12 (acknowledging criti-
cisms of the rulemaking process). The House Judiciary Committee vividly summarized its
conception of the problems in the rulemaking process:
Critics have asserted that the process lacks openness, including inadequate notice
about proposed rules, insufficient public participation, closed meetings, and inade-
quate access to decision-making documents. The rule-making process has also been
criticized for many years for the absence of a published set of rules for the judiciary
to follow. This deficiency was recently cured, but only several years after the need
for such a change became obvious.
Id These problems with the rulemaking framework had been observed in a number of impor-
tant studies. See, e.g., WEINSTIN, supra note 31, at 106-115 (calling for a reexamination of
the rulemaking process); Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time for Re-
examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579, 580 (1975) (identifying four areas of the rulemaking process
that require reexamination).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2) (1988).
109. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S16,296 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Senator
Heflin); 1985 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 4 (stating that "[t]he purpose of the legislation
is to revise the process by which rules of procedure used in federal judicial proceedings, and
the Federal Rules of Evidence, become effective, to the end that the rulemaking process pro-
vides for greater participation by all segments of the bench and bar"); id at 24 (describing need
for representation of various groups and interests in committees, but deciding not to impose
specific requirements for committee composition and stating that the House Judiciary Com-
mittee "expects that the Conference will act promptly to rectify the concerns about representa-
tiveness of the committees"). These reforms had also been advocated by many prior
proponents of reform. See, eg., Lesnick, supra note 107, at 581-82 (calling for a composition
of advisory committees that is more representative). But see Hazard, supra note 94, at 1291-92
(criticizing arguments in favor of representation of diverse groups in rulemaking process).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(d) (1988). Specifically this section requires that, "[i]n making a
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applies not only to the committees appointed by the Judicial Conference,
but also to the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court. I"'
Requiring open meetings of the committees and full explanation of
recommendations and minority views at each stage of rulemaking are
relatively new practices that respond to the problems associated with the
relatively closed past practices. These reforms will help to assure full
discussion and development of proposed rule changes before they are
presented to the Supreme Court. 1 2 The provisions concerning open
meetings do not apply to either the Judicial Conference or the Supreme
Court, which remain free to decide how open to make their meetings. 13
This leads to the significant question of the Supreme Court's actual
role in the rulemaking process. Direct knowledge of the Supreme
Court's role can come only through specific comments from the Supreme
Court Justices themselves. However, their deliberations on proposed
rule changes are secret. 1 4 The only specific information comes from in-
dividual Justices through scattered statements in United States Reports
when the Supreme Court transmits its proposals to Congress. These spo-
recommendation under this section or under section 2072, the body making that recommenda-
tion shall provide a proposed rule, an explanatory note on the rule, and a written report ex-
plaining the body's action, including any minority or other separate views." Id.
11I. Since the Supreme Court is a body that prescribes rules under § 2072, it is arguably a
body that makes recommendations under § 2073(d), which are required to be accompanied by
the above explanations. The Judicial Conference is clearly a body encompassed by § 2073(d).
See 1985 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 26 (stating that reporting requirement applies to
Judicial Conference and Supreme Court as well as rulemaking committees, and explaining that
the statute largely codifies existing practice and adds a requirement of "gap reports" to indi-
cate changes to predecessor group's report and rationale for changes).
112. See generally WEINSTEIN, supra note 31, at 87 ("Recognizing the need to make judi-
cial rulemaking a public process is healthy. When courts assume a legislative role, they should
also assume the restraints that accompany that role. Public deliberations are a basic safeguard
to insure a legislative process that is fair and informed."). But see, e.g., 1985 HousE REPORT,
supra note 20, at 44-45 (letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General Phillip D. Brady to
Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman of House Committee on the Judiciary, expressing Department
of Justice's view that open meeting requirement might deter effective rule drafting and that
public participation could be adequately assured by public comment on rule proposals). Pro-
fessor Linda Mullinex is concerned that opening up the rulemaking process will politicize it
and will weaken the role of the Advisory Committee in rulemaking, thereby placing proce-
dural reform in the hands of Congress. Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory
Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 797-802 (1991).
These conclusions do not necessarily follow from the recent reform of the rulemaking process;
affording the public notice and opportunity to be heard before Advisory Committee meetings
might actually strengthen the support for ultimate Advisory Committee proposals and need
not result in politicized rulemaking.
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)(1) (1988); 1985 HousE REPORT, supra note 20, at 25.
114. See BROWN, supra note 68, at 7 (stating that the Court "is believed to review the rules
at a Court conference session" and that recently Court review has usually resulted in approval
of proposed Rules and submission to Congress).
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radic comments suggest that the role of most Supreme Court Justices is
essentially supervisory, with the Court only occasionally exercising a
veto over submissions from the Judicial Conference. 115
From the beginning, individual Justices have dissented from pro-
posed Rules transmitted by the Court to Congress. The initial set of
Rules was transmitted to Congress with the notation, "Mr. Justice Bran-
deis states that he does not approve of the adoption of the Rules," 116 but
without explanation of his rationale. In subsequent years proposed
amendments to the Rules were sometimes transmitted to Congress with-
out any dissent mentioned.' 1 7 At other times, certain individual Justices
simply noted their disapproval." 8 When particular Justices have ex-
pressed their rationales for dissenting, their commentaries have offered
115. See Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 63, at 2122 (stating that the Court has
promulgated every rule change recommended to it by the Civil Rules Committee and the
Judicial Conference). This is no longer true, since the Court did not forward to Congress
proposed amendments to Rule 4 in 1990. See supra note 104. See also WEINSTEIN, supra note
31, at 100 (stating that the Court's amendments to rules have been "minuscule" but noting
that the Court did not forward to Congress the Advisory Committee proposal regarding the
work-product rule proposed in 1946; rather, it handled the issues through Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495 (1947)). But see Clark, supra note 92, at 252 (stating that the record of the Court
in rulemaking "is one of careful and responsible supervision, ... a supervision which would
become active when necessary, but would in general leave details to the 'informed judgment' of
a carefully chosen Advisory Committee").
116. 302 U.S. 783 (1937).
117. See, eg., Order of Apr. 30, 1991, 1ll S. Ct. 813 (1991) (amending more than a dozen
Rules); Order of Apr. 25, 1988, 485 U.S. 1045 (1988) (amending two Rules); Order of Mar. 2,
1987, 480 U.S. 955 (1987) (amending substantial number of Rules, largely for technical rea-
sons); Order of Apr. 29, 1985, 471 U.S. 1155 (1985) (amending approximately ten Rules);
Order of Apr. 28, 1983, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983) (amending more than a dozen Rules); Order of
Apr. 28, 1982, 456 U.S. 1015 (1982) (amending Rule 4); Order of Dec. 4, 1967, 389 U.S. 1065
(1967) (amending five Rules); Order of Mar. 18, 1963, 374 U.S. 872 (1963) (amending one
Rule); Order of Apr. 30, 1951, 341 U.S. 962 (1951) (amending two Rules and adding two
Forms); Order of Dec. 29, 1948, 335 U.S. 923 (1948) (amending more than a dozen Rules); 12
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 361
(1973) (Order of Dec. 18, 1972, amending Rule 43); see also Order of Dec. 27, 1946, 329 U.S.
843 (1946) (amending numerous Rules, with the notation that "Justice Frankfurter joins in
approval of the proposed amendments essentially because of his confidence in the informed
judgment of the Advisory Committee on Rules").
118. Instances in which particular Justices simply noted their dissent or disapproval with-
out any additional explanation include: Order of Mar. 1, 1971, 401 U.S. 1019 (1971) (amend-
ing five Rules and certain Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Appellate Procedure, with
Justices Black and Douglas dissenting); Order of Mar. 30, 1970, 398 U.S. 979 (1970) (primar-
ily amending discovery rules, with Justices Black and Douglas writing that they "disapprove of
the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating to Discovery, and dissent
from the action of the Court in transmitting them to the Congress"); Order of Dec. 28, 1939,
308 U.S. 642, 642-43 (1939) (amending Rule 81(a)(6) to provide that the Rules not apply to
certain legislation, with Justice Black dissenting).
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an insight into the Court's process for approving amendments to the
Rules and into fundamental issues about procedural rulemaking.
The first reasoned dissent from the Court's proposed Rules came in
1961, when both Justices Black and Douglas stated that the matters in-
volved should be decided by Congress as a matter of legislative policy."19
Justice Black generally refused to approve the proposed Rules because he
believed "that it would be better for Congress to act directly by legisla-
tion on the matters treated by the Rules."'120 Justice Douglas urged the
rejection of a proposed Rule concerning the burden of establishing the
continuation of a controversy with a successor of a governmental officer
originally sued. In opposition, Douglas stated that, "language so care-
fully tailored by Congress is now rejected by the professional group who
constitute our advisors in these matters. I do not think we should allow
a known and established congressional policy to be so readily
abrogated."' 21
In 1963, Justices Black and Douglas also objected to the proposed
amendment of more than a dozen Rules, arguing that many of the pro-
posals "determine matters so substantially affecting the rights of litigants
in law suits that in practical effect they are the equivalent of new legisla-
tion" and that both the Constitution and the Rules Enabling Act require
Congress to enact such legislation.1 22 The two Justices were particularly
concerned that the restrictions of the Rules Enabling Act were not satis-
fied and noted that changes in the directed verdict provisions of Rule 50
encroached upon the right to jury trial. 23 They advocated repeal of
Rule 49 special verdicts because they interfered with the constitutional
power of juries. They also urged major amendment to Rule 41, concern-
ing dismissal of actions, to protect plaintiffs against their attorneys' mis-
takes.' 24 Finally, they urged that the amendment of Rule 4 that allowed
service outside the state by garnishment or attachment when permitted
119. Order of Apr. 17, 1961, 368 U.S. 1012 (1961) (amending Rules relating to substitu-
tion of parties in suits against public officials, entry of judgment in suits involving multiple
claims or multiple parties, and stays of judgment as to multiple claims or multiple parties).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1014. Justice Douglas relied on particular statutory provisions and Committee
Reports he felt demonstrated the appropriateness of having Congress, rather than the Court,
amend Rule 25. Id. at 1013-14. He described the other proposed changes as "picayune and
harmless, yet hardly worth making apart from any overall revision of the Rules." Id. at 1012.
122. Order of Jan. 21, 1963, 374 U.S. 865, 865-66 (1963).
123. Id. at 866-67. Similarly, they objected to the amendment of Rule 56(e) because it
made it more difficult to protect against summary judgment, thereby letting judges rather than
juries resolve more cases. Id. at 867.
124. Id. at 868.
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by state law was unjustified, unwarranted, and inappropriate absent a
congressional finding.125
Despite their objections to the proposed Rules, Justices Black and
Douglas simply concluded that the Rules Enabling Act should be
amended to place the duty of recommending Rule changes on the Judi-
cial Conference rather than on the Court.126 This recommendation was
odd, in that it did not address the fundamental nature of the two Justices'
objections to the specific Rules proposed. Instead, the Justices com-
mended the Judicial Conference and its Committees for their work in
preparing amendments of the Rules and noted that usually the Court
approved the work of the Judicial Conference and only occasionally ve-
toed proposals. 127 Thus, as described by the two Justices, the Court's
involvement in the drafting process was nonexistent.' 28
In subsequent years, Justices Douglas and Black echoed their con-
cerns that proposed amendments to the Federal Rules unconstitutionally
involved the Court in lawmaking. They also raised objections to particu-
lar proposed amendments on various grounds. 129 For example, in 1966
Justice Black objected to Rules amendments that gave district-judges
125. Id at 869.
126. Id at 869-70.
127. Justices Black and Douglas wrote:
The present rules ... are not prepared by us but by Committees of the Judicial
Conference designated by the Chief Justice, and before coming to us they are ap-
proved by the Judicial Conference .... It is they, however, who do the work, not
we, and the rules have only our imprimatur. The only contribution that we actually
make is an occasional exercise of a veto power. If the rule-making for Federal Dis-
trict Courts is to continue under the present plan, we believe that the Supreme Court
should not have any part in the task; rather, the statute should be amended to substi-
tute the Judicial Conference. The Judicial Conference can participate more actively
in fashioning the rules and affirmatively contribute to their content and design better
than we can. Transfer of the function to the Judicial Conference would relieve us of
the embarrassment of having to sit in judgment on the constitutionality of rules
which we have approved and which as applied in given situations might have to be
declared invalid.
Id at 870. This is really the first public description of the Court's involvement in the modem
rulemaking process.
128. But see 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1004, at 25-26 (2d ed. 1987) ("Although for obvious reasons of necessity the
Court has left much of the actual work of drafting and research to the Advisory Committee, it
has provided a continuous leadership and supervision that too frequently has been misunder-
stood and minimized.").
129. See, eg., Order of Mar. 1, 1971, 401 U.S. 1019 (1971) (amending several Rules, with
Justices Black and Douglas dissent without explanation); 398 U.S. 979 (1970) (Justices Black
and Douglas jointly "disapprove of the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
relating to Discovery, and dissent from the action of the Court in transmitting them to the
Congress," without further explanation); Order of Feb. 28, 1966, 383 U.S. 1031, 1032 (1966)
(amending the rules) (Black, J., dissenting).
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greater power to use pretrial procedures to dismiss cases on the ground
that such dismissals could impair due process protections by not provid-
ing opportunities for full trials on the merits.' 30 Justice Black's dissent
included a memorandum he had distributed to the other Justices in an
effort to encourage their examination of the proposals before transmittal
to the Congress.' 3 ' At the same time, Justice Douglas reiterated his be-
lief that the Judicial Conference rather than the Court should promul-
gate the Rules and indicated his dissatisfaction with the Court's role as a
mere conduit.' 32 In 1972 Justice Douglas objected to the submission of
the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence on the grounds that they were
not within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act's authorization of rules of
practice and procedure. Again, Douglas felt it was improper for the
Court to act simply as a conduit for the rules.' 33
Since the departure of Justices Black and Douglas from the Court,
statements dissenting from proposed Rules have been filed on two occa-
sions. The first of these two dissents was based on grounds very different
from those of Black and Douglas. In 1980 Justice Powell, joined by Jus-
tices Stewart and Rehnquist, objected to proposed amendments of the
rules governing discovery on the grounds that the proposed changes were
inadequate to deal with serious problems of discovery abuse. 134 These
Justices feared that if the proposed amendments were accepted by Con-
gress, there would be no further or effective reform of discovery for an-
other decade. They recommended rejection of the amendments and a
reexamination of the entire discovery process by the Judicial Confer-
ence.1 35 In passing, these three Justices mentioned the formalistic role of
the Court in developing the Rules, 136 almost inviting Congress not to
defer to the Court.
130. 383 U.S. 1031, 1034 (1966). He also objected to changes in the Rules on class actions
because of the great discretion they gave to trial judges, and to Rule 41 on the grounds that
dismissals should not operate as an adjudication on the merits. He suggested that an addi-
tional amendment to Rule 41 should be included to protect parties from their counsel's mis-
takes. Id. at 1032-37.
131. Id. at 1035-37.
132. Id. at 1089-90. Speaking of proposals to amend the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, Justice Douglas wrote, "I cannot be only a conduit. I think that placing our imprimatur
on the amendments to the Rules entails a large degree of responsibility ofjudgment concerning
them." Id. at 1090.
133. 409 U.S. 1132, 1132-34 (1972).
134. Order of Apr. 29, 1980, 446 U.S. 997, 998 (1980).
135. Id. at 997-1001.
136. Justice Powell wrote in a footnote:
This Court's role in the rulemaking process is largely formalistic. Standing and advi-
sory committees of the Judicial Conference make the initial studies, invite comments
on their drafts, and prepare the Rules. Both the Judicial Conference and this Court
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Most recently, in April 1993, two major statements were ified re-
garding proposed amendments to the Federal Rules that were being
transmitted. 137 The statement of Justice White explored the history of
the Court's involvement in rulemaking and concluded that the role of the
Court was quite limited. 138 The dissenting statement of Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Thomas and by Justice Souter in part, objected to
amendments to Rule 11 and to the discovery rules. 139 Furthermore, the
Chief Justice's transmittal letter suggested a limited rulemaking role for
the Court. 140
Justice White's statement, made on the eve of his retirement after
thirty-one years on the Court, agreed with the assessment that the
Court's role in rulemaking is limited. 141 Specifically, he wrote:
necessarily rely upon the careful work of these committees. Congress should bear in
mind that our approval of proposed Rules is more a certification that they are the
products of proper procedures than a considered judgment on the merits of the pro-
posals themselves.
I at 997-98 n.1. He then cited several of the dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Doug-
las discussed above. See supra notes 119-131.
137. 61 U.S.L.W. 4365, 4390, 4392 (Apr. 27, 1993).
138. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Statement of Justice White, 61
U.S.L.W. 4390 (Apr. 27, 1993).
139. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Dissenting Statement of Jus-
tice Scalia, 61 U.S.L.W. 4392 (Apr. 27, 1993). Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's state-
ment in full; Justice Souter joined the portion dissenting from the proposed amendments to the
discovery rules.
140. Chief Justice Rehnquist's transmittal letter to the Speaker of the House stated:
"While the Court is satisfied that the required procedures have been observed, this transmittal
does not necessarily indicate that the Court itself would have proposed these amendments in
the form submitted." 146 F.R.D. 403 (1993) (letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
to Speaker of the House Thomas S. Foley, Apr. 22, 1993).
141. Justice White noted that the Court usually transmitted the proposals submitted by
the Judicial Conference without dissent (aside from Justices Black and Douglas). Id. at 4391.
He expressed agreement with the suggestion of Justices Black and Douglas that the Court
should be relieved of rulemaking function. Id. Acknowledging that Congress had continued
the Court's role in rulemaking, he wrote:
But most of us concluded that for at least two reasons Congress could not have
intended us to provide another layer of review equivalent to that of the standing
committee and the Judicial Conference. First, to perform such a function would take
an inordinate amount of time, the expenditure of which would be inconsistent with
the demands of a growing caseload. Second, some us, [sic] and I remain of this view,
were quite sure that the Judicial Conference and its committees, "being in large part
judges of the lower courts and attorneys who are using the Rules day in and day out,
are in a far better position to make a practical judgment upon their utility or inutility
than we." 383 U.S. 1089, 1090 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Ia As a result, he determined that, "[alt the very least, we should not perform a de novo
review and should defer to the Judicial Conference and its Committees as long as they have
some rational basis for their proposed amendments." Id at 4392.
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[A]s I have seen the Court's role over the years, it is to transmit the
Judicial Conference's recommendations without change and without
careful study, as long as there is no suggestion that the committee sys-
tem has not operated with integrity.... This has been my practice,
even though on several occasions, based perhaps on out-of-date con-
ceptions, I had serious questions about the wisdom of particular pro-
posals to amend certain rules. 142
These proposed rules met that test, but he concluded with the warning
not to assume that the Court had more than a limited role in transmitting
proposed rule amendments. 143
Justice Scalia, writing a dissenting statement objecting to the con-
tent of the proposed changes to Rule 11 and to the discovery rules, took a
completely different approach than Justice White. With respect to Rule
11, he believed:
The proposed revision would render the Rule toothless, by allowing
judges to dispense with sanction, by disfavoring compensation for liti-
gation expenses, and by providing a 21-day "safe harbor" within
which, if the party accused of a frivolous filing withdraws the filing, he
is entitled to escape with no sanction at all.144
According to Justice Scalia, the proposals for discovery reform, particu-
larly the requirement of a duty to disclose relevant information to oppos-
ing counsel before any request, will increase the discovery burdens on
parties and judges, and will conflict with the lawyer's role in an adversary
system. 145 Moreover, the proposal was hotly criticized, and change
should await the results of ongoing experimentation. 146 Justice Scalia
believed that these were "not matters of expert detail, but rise to the level
of principle and purpose.... It takes no expert to know that a measure
which eliminates rather than strengthens a deterrent to frivolous litiga-
tion is not what the times demand; and that a breathtakingly novel revi-
sion of discovery practice should not be adopted nationwide without a
trial run."' 147 Thus Justice Scalia's dissent reflects a willingness to be
more active in rulemaking, or at least in the evaluation of rulemaking,
than Justice White or perhaps the other Justices.
142. Id.
143. Id. See also supra note 140 (Chief Justice's transmittal letter stating Court's limited
role).
144. Dissenting Statement of Justice Scalia, 61 U.S.L.W. 4392 (Apr. 27, 1993). He ex-
plained at some length the basis for his objections, concluding that the proposed changes "gut-
ted" an effective Rule. Id. at 4393. Justice Scalia did not object, however, to the amendment
making law firms liable for their attorney's conduct, id. at 4393 n. 1, despite the fact that this
provision overturned his decision in Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493
U.S. 120 (1989). See infra notes 168-176.
145. Dissenting statement of Justice Scalia, 61 U.S.L.W. at 4393.
146. Id at 4393-94.
147. Id. at 4394.
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Despite the arguments by Justices Black and Douglas, now echoed
by Justice White, that the Supreme Court should not be engaged in the
rulemaking process and that the Supreme Court's role as a conduit is
inappropriate, the basic framework requiring proposed rules to travel
from committees to the Judicial Conference, to the Supreme Court, and
finally to Congress has been retained. In a sense, the limited role of the
Court reflects the reality of the Court's workload. 148 Significant addi-
tional work on the drafting of proposed rules is not likely to be embraced
by the current Justices, who have occasionally sought measures to reduce
their workload in other areas. 149 Although respected commentators have
long advocated alternatives to the Court's current limited rulemaking
role,150 the continuation of this limited role reflects a certain reality.
Even though the role of the Court is most frequently that of a conduit, it
does afford the Court the opportunity for occasional direct participation
in the rulemaking process. Moreover, the current system preserves the
perception that the highest component of the third coequal branch has
reviewed the proposed changes and supports (or at least does not object
to) their adoption. 151
Despite the Court's limited rulemaking participation, a possible con-
flict exists between the Court's role as rulemaker and as adjudicator of
the validity of Rules.,152 This dilemma arises because the Court may be
148. See, eg., Statement of Justice White, 61 U.S.L.W. 4390 (Apr. 27, 1993) (stating that
Court could not be substantially more active in rulemaking.since it "would take an inordinate
amount of time" and "would be inconsistent with the demands of a growing caseload");
BROWN, supra note 68, at vi (quoting statement of Chief Justice Burger questioning the ability
of the Court to study closely proposed Rules and wondering whether Court's role in rulemak-
ing was meaningful); WEINSTEIN, supra note 31, at 192 n.382 (suggesting that the Court be
more involved in rulemaking is "unrealistic in view of the Court's heavy workload"). But see
Friedenthal, supra note 94, at 685-86 (urging that the Court could and should take a more
active role in the rulemaking process and should not merely act as a conduit).
149. See, eg., Warren E' Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary; 69 A.B.A.J.
442 (1983) (discussing methods of reducing Supreme Court's workload).
150. See, eg., WEINSTEIN, supra note 31, at 106-115 (recommending that the Judicial
Conference review proposals of the advisory committees and forward them to Congress, bypas-
sing the Court, and that Congress confine itself to significant policy issues rather than details of
rulemaking). An alternative to having the Judicial Conference promulgate the Rules would be
to create an independent commission, comprised of members selected by Congress and the
judiciary, to engage in rulemaking. See, eg., Lesnick, supra note 107, at 582-83. But see
Clark, supra note 92, at 256-57 (criticizing any rulemaking body other than Court and ob-
jecting particularly to the Judicial Conference as ultimate rulemaker).
151. Cf Clark, supra note 92, at 257-58 (supporting the role of the Judicial Conference
and the Supreme Court in adopting rules); Lesnick, supra note 107, at 582-83 (advocating
delegation of rulemaking to an independent commission appointed by Congress, with leaders
chosen from both the legislative and judicial branches).
152. The potential for conflict between these-roles was perceived by Justices Black and
Douglas in the context of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and by Justice Frankfurter in
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required in the context of subsequent litigation to consider the validity of
a Rule that it had previously approved and submitted to Congress. This
problem was glossed over by the Court in Hanna,15 3 but it has troubled
commentators for years. 154 The problems associated with the Court's
dual roles were presented to Congress during the course of the debate on
the revision of the Rules Enabling Act. 155 Congress, however, did not
deem them compelling enough to warrant removing the Court from its
rulemaking role.
Thus, the modem role of the judicial branch in the promulgation of
the Rules remains substantially formalistic. The Court reviews and ap-
proves the Rules before their transmission to Congress, but it does not
become deeply involved in the drafting process. By requiring a statement
of minority as well as majority views and a statement of changes made
during the course of the rulemaking process, the 1988 legislation may
yield more detailed explanations by the Court of any changes it makes to
the recommendations of the Judicial Conference. Possibly, these new re-
porting requirements will induce more activism by the Court in the
rulemaking process. However, the overall workload of the Court makes
this possibility appear slim.
the context of the Criminal Procedure Rules. See 323 U.S. 821, 821-23 (1944) (Justice Frank-
furter dissenting from the Order of Dec. 26, 1944 regarding criminal rules amendments be-
cause of the danger of prejudging issues that might later arise in litigation); supra notes 119-
131.
153. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (stating that promulgation of a Rule is a
"prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling
Act nor constitutional restrictions").
154. See generally BROWN, supra note 68, at 75-78. See also WEINSTEIN, supra note 31,
at 98-99; Lesnick, supra note 107, at 582. But see Hazard, supra note 94, at 1288-89 (contend-
ing that it is not different from the position of the Court whenever it fashions common law
rules, and also arguing that to the extent that the Court acts as a conduit, it has not lost its
objectivity in later determinations of rule validity).
155. Rules Enabling Act of 1985: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
54, 68, 90-91 (1985) (statement of Paul F. Rothstein, Chairperson of Comm. on Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association); id. at 234
(letter dated June 5, 1985 from Nan Aron, Alliance for Justice; Laura Macklin, Institute for
Public Representation; and Judith Resnick, Dennis Curtis, and William Genego, University of
Southern California Law School, to Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairperson of the Subcommit-
tee); Rules Enabling Act: Hearings on H.R. 4144 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liber-
ties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st
and 2d Sess. 32, 37 (1983, 1984) (statement of Alan B. Morrison, Director of Public Citizen
Litigation Group); id. at 42 (statement of James F. Holderman, Chairman of Subcomm. on the
Rules Enabling Act, Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association); id. at 149, 151
(statement of Burt Neuborne, Legal Director of American Civil Liberties Union). The various
proposals of academics and judges for refashioning the rulemaking process in a number of
distinctive ways are summarized and evaluated in BROWN, supra note 68, at 79-117.
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C. Conclusions on Rulemaking
The relationship between the Court and Congress in the rulemaking
process is undergoing some transition, the full extent of which remains
unknown and unpredictable. Congress has recently expressed, at least at
the committee level, a desire to restrict the scope of the Court's rulemak-
ing to purely procedural topics, somewhat more constricted than the
scope of possible congressional authority. On sporadic occasions, Con-
gress has also become more active in the rulemaking process. However,
Congress has generally retained the framework of the original Rules En-
abling Act and remains committed to delegating basic rulemaking func-
tions to the Court.
The rulemaking process has been opened up, with requirements of
open committee meetings and reporting by rulemaking bodies of the ma-
jority and minority rationales. These changes will result in a more con-
scious consideration of the limitations on rulemaking inherent in the
Rules Enabling Act and of the competing factors relevant to the selection
of a particular Rule.
The modern rulemaking framework will, nonetheless, still produce
Rules that require interpretation in litigated cases. Courts will have to
confront ambiguities in particular Rules and situations in which the ar-
guably plain language of a Rule may produce unforeseen or undesirable
results if the Rule is applied literally. Thus, the Court will continue to
face, notwithstanding the modem rulemaking framework, questions
about appropriate standards for interpretation of Rules, which are ana-
lyzed in Part II of this Article.
H. The Court's Recent Approach to Interpretation of Federal
Rules in Litigation: The Emphasis on "Plain Meaning"
In the last decade, the Court has increasingly relied on a "plain
meaning" analysis to dispose of difficult questions involving the interpre-
tation and application of various Federal Rules. The cases using plain
meaning analysis concern diverse provisions of Federal Rules, ranging
from technical and relatively mundane issues to significant policy deter-
minations. This application of plain meaning analysis to the Federal
Rules parallels the renaissance of the doctrine in the statutory interpreta-
tion context, which has generated significant, mostly critical
commentary. 156
156. See, ag., infra note 167.
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In the statutory interpretation arena, the increasing focus on plain
meaning analysis is most commonly attributed to Justice Scalia.157 How-
ever, it has also been embraced to varying degrees by other Justices, 5"
and draws from a rich history. 5 9 In essence, the adherents of the plain
meaning doctrine emphasize that it is the duty of the courts to interpret
the text of statutes; when the text is clear, there is no legitimate reason
for the courts to inquire into legislative intent, to look at legislative his-
tory, or to consider whether the plain meaning of the statute furthers the
legislature's policy goals. Rather, the courts must only apply the plain
meaning of the statute. 160 This approach is also called a textualist ap-
proach,1 61 or "the new textualism."' 162
Plain meaning adherents often find that statutory language is clear,
even when others argue that the same statutory language is ambiguous.
Thus, they are seldom confronted with an opportunity to explore legisla-
157. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 623
(1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, New Textualism]; Stock, supra note 41, at 160; Note, Rejecting
Legislative History, supra note 41, at 1005.
158. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed
Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REv. 745, 761-62 (1990) (concluding that all nine Justices apply
plain meaning standard without consideration of the Rule's purpose when interpreting Federal
Rules of Evidence); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function
of Plain Meaning, 1990 Sup. Cr. REV. 231, 246, 249 (arguing that plain meaning analysis is
not limited to Justice Scalia, but is applied by every member of the Court).
159. See generally Harry W. Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the
Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 2 (1939) (describing plain meaning rule as
it then existed and criticizing its failure to consider extrinsic aids to ascertain legislative intent
or the effect of a statute); Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning
Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299
(1975) (describing decline of plain meaning rule, and urging that courts should expressly reject
plain meaning rule and develop a coherent doctrine of statutory interpretation). Compare Pa-
tricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court
Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195 (1983) (concluding that by 1982 the plain meaning doctrine no
longer was applied) with Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History
in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L.
Rav. 277, 282 (1990) [hereinafter Wald, Sizzling Sleeper] (criticizing resurgence in 1988 Term
of plain meaning doctrine and the textualist position of Justice Scalia).
160. See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, Ill S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (1991)
("The best evidence of [congressional] purpose is the statutory text .... [which cannot] be
expanded or contracted by the statements of individual legislators or committees during the
course of the enactment process."). This opinion is significant because it was a majority opin-
ion written by Justice Scalia and joined by all of the Justices except Justices Stevens, Marshall,
and Blackmun. Justice Scalia has expressed similar views in a number of individual opinions.
See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
161. See generally Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990) (various statements, including
that of Representative Kastenmeier).
162. Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 157, at 623.
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tive intent or legislative history. However, in the rare case when a literal
interpretation would produce an absurd result, even Justice Scalia would
not require blind adherence to the plain meaning and would permit con-
sultation of legislative history to ascertain congressional intent. 63
Scholars have attempted to understand, justify, and criticize the de-
velopment of the plain meaning doctrine during the last decade. Some
justify the doctrine's growth by looking at the practicalities of the legisla-
tive process, specifically the suspected efforts of members of Congress
and their staffs to manipulate the development of legislative history in
order to affect subsequent judicial interpretation of statutory text.' 64
This argument fails to recognize the equally likely possibility that other
members of Congress will react to counteract an attempted distortion of
legislative history.1 65 Other scholars have described the development of
the plain meaning doctrine as reflecting a search for a common ground
among Justices with widely varying views.166 Most, however, have de-
cried the burgeoning emphasis on the plain meaning doctrine in the con-
text of statutory interpretation. 67 These criticisms of the plain meaning
163. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring). As
others have noted, it is not clear why Justice Scalia would countenance the use of legislative
history in these situations, in light of his other objections to the use of legislative history. See,
e.g., Wald, Sizzling Sleeper, supra note 159, at 296-97.
164. See, eg., Note, Rejecting Legislative History, supra note 41, at 1012 (stating that legis-
lative history is distorted because of expectation of legislators that judges will rely on legisla-
tive history). But see Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and
Congress: A Challenge for Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L. J. 653, 668 (1992) (concluding
that Congress and its Committees and staff are not aware of many court decisions and do not
generally frame statutes or legislative history with a view toward influencing subsequent judi-
cial interpretation).
165. An interesting illustration of efforts to use legislative history to explain contradictory
views of a statutes meaning is found in the 1991 Civil Rights Act, discussed briefly in Note,
Rejecting Legislative History, supra note 41, at 1018-19. This situation, however, is unusual
and involves a highly political issue with great visibility. Congress could only attain agreement
on certain provisions, and different groups in Congress were attempting to convey their views
on highly charged topics through the development of legislative history. There is no basis for
believing that this is the typical situation with respect to the development of legislative history.
166. Schauer, supra note 158, at 232, 254-56 (describing renaissance of plain meaning doc-
trine as "a solution to a coordination problem, substitut[ing] a second-best coordinating solu-
tion for a theoretically optimizing but likely self-defeating search for first-best solutions by
multiple decisionmakers with different goals and different perspectives").
167. See generally Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 41, at 552-53 (criticizing textualists for
depriving the courts of useful information regarding the meaning of statutes); Farber &
Frickey, supra note 41, at 452-61 (rejecting the "four corners rule" as applied to the interpreta-
tion of ambiguous statutes); John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic
Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEo. L. J. 565, 572 (1992) (criticizing Justice Scalia for requiring
so much specificity and foresight by Congress that it will be difficult to enact adequate legisla-
tion); McNollgast, supra note 39, at 738-40 (criticizing textualists for ignoring a vital source of
information and evidence regarding interpretations that would have been chosen by the legisla-
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doctrine are especially appropriate when interpretation of the Federal
Rules is at issue.
Section A of this Part of the Article will explore the recent decisions
of the Court applying the plain meaning analysis to cases involving inter-
pretation of Rule 11, a rule involving significant policy issues. In Section
B, these decisions will be compared with the Court's recent use of the
plain meaning doctrine to analyze procedural statutes promulgated by
Congress. Section C establishes that the plain meaning doctrine is partic-
ularly inappropriate in cases construing the Federal Rules. Finally, Sec-
tion D offers an alternative method of analyzing the Federal Rules,
which includes consideration by the Court of the purpose and policies of
a Rule as well as its text, and applies this analysis to the Rule 11 cases.
A. The Recent Rule 11 Cases: Cases Involving Significant Policy
Determinations
A series of cases decided between 1989 and 1991 involving Rule 11
illustrates the Court's development of a plain meaning approach in the
context of a Rule fraught with major policy implications. In the first of
these cases, Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group,168 the
Court addressed the question of whether the Rule's authorization of
sanctions on the "person who signed" a pleading or other paper permit-
ted a court to impose sanctions not only against the attorney who actu-
ally signed the paper but also against the attorney's law firm. Justice
Scalia, joined by all members of the Court except for Justice Marshall,169
concluded that the plain meaning of the quoted language, in the context
of the whole rule, meant sanctions could be imposed only against the
individual signing the document.
Justice Scalia's plain meaning framework for analyzing the Federal
Rules bears some scrutiny. First, he established as a touchstone that the
tion's enacting coalition and urging that attention should be paid to the views of legislators
whose votes are pivotal); Stock, supra note 41, at 174-75 (rejecting as "completely fallacious"
the argument that legislative history is created by nonlegislators and therefore inadmissible);
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 416-23
(1989) (criticizing textualism on grounds that it ignores culture and context of a statute, fails
to deal adequately with problems of vagueness, ambiguity, over- and under-inclusiveness, gaps,
and changed circumstances).
168. 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
169. It is surprising that only Justice Marshall dissented, since, as is explained infra, other
Justices have frequently expressed reluctance to embrace Justice Scalia's textualist approach.
But see Jonakait, supra note 158, at 761-62 (noting use of plain meaning standard in some
Federal Rules of Evidence cases by all Justices); Schauer, supra note 158, at 249 (arguing that
all current Justices use the plain meaning analysis as a strong factor in their decisional process
involving statutory interpretation).
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Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning. Analogizing to statu-
tory interpretation principles, he stated that when the terms of a Federal
Rule are unambiguous, "'judicial inquiry is complete."' 170 He conceded
that the phrase "person who signed" is ambiguous when standing alone.
He concluded, however, that when considered in the context of the entire
Rule, the phrase permitting sanctions to be imposed on "the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both" 171 must be interpreted to permit
sanctions only against the individual attorney who signed, and not the
attorney's law firm. Justice Scalia wrote:
In other contexts the phrase "the person who signed it" might
bear the somewhat technical legal meaning of the natural or juridical
person in whose name or on whose behalf the paper was signed; but in
a paragraph beginning with a requirement of individual signature, and
then proceeding to discuss the import and consequences of signature,
we think references to the signer in the later portions must reasonably
be thought to connote the individual signer mentioned at the out-
set.... Just as the requirement of signature is imposed upon the indi-
vidual, we think the recited import and consequences of signature run
as to him. 172
Justice Scalia then proceeded to reject the alternative interpretation of
the Rule, which would have allowed sanctions against the attorney and
the attorney's firm. He argued that such an interpretation conflicted
with the Rule's specificity in permitting sanctions against either the attor-
ney or the represented party or both.173
Justice Scalia's opinion in Pavelic & LeFlore firmly rejects the possi-
bility of a policy analysis informing the interpretation of the Rule's text.
In a critical passage in the opinion, Justice Scalia wrote:
Even if it were entirely certain that liability on the part of the firm
would more effectively achieve the purposes of the Rule, we would not
feel free to pursue that objective at the expense of a textual interpreta-
tion as unnatural as we have described. Our task is to apply the text,
not to improve upon it.174
170. 493 U.S. at 123 (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)).
171. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
172. 493 U.S. at 124.
173. Although Justice Scalia was firmly committed to a pure textual analysis, he inserted
several comments about the reasonableness of his interpretation and the import of the lan-
guage of the Rule. His comments suggested that the Rule's meaning is perhaps not so plain or
unambiguous as might otherwise appear. Thus, for example, in rejecting the argument that
principles of partnership and agency might make all members of a partnership liable for the
acts of a partner, Justice Scalia concluded that because the signature of an attorney constitutes
a certification that the attorney has determined that the paper is well grounded in fact and law,
and since this duty is nondelegable, "one may reasonably expect [the text of the Rule] to
authorize punishment only of the party upon whom the duty is placed. We think that to be the
fair import of the language here." Id. at 125.
174. Id at 126.
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This rejection of policy analysis is partially dependent on the perception
that any other reading of the Rule's text would be terribly unnatural.
Nevertheless, the message is clear: The Court's duty is to apply the text,
regardless of the policy implications.
Despite Justice Scalia's rejection of policy analysis when the text is
unambiguous, he nonetheless proceeded to provide a policy evaluation.
He conceded that a sanction imposed upon the partnership would be
more likely to secure the compensation for the innocent party. However,
he emphasized that the purpose of this provision was to sanction the
wrongdoer, not to reimburse the victim, and that "the purpose of Rule
11 as a whole is to bring home to the individual signer his personal, non-
delegable responsibility."' 17 5 Since in his view these purposes might be
better achieved by sanctions against the individual attorney alone, a pol-
icy analysis would not "compel the conclusion that the Rule does not
mean what it most naturally seems to say."' 176 Interestingly, Justice
Scalia cited no sources whatsoever in his policy discussion. He was ap-
parently content to speculate on the likely purposes of the Rule and on
the likely effects of the varying interpretations. This made it much easier
to reject totally the significance of policy analysis and to focus exclusively
on the text of the Rule.
In many ways Justice Scalia's opinion is typical of plain meaning
analysis. Although it does not entirely focus on the literal text of a single
phrase in the Rule, it concludes that the text, when taken in the context
of the whole Rule, 177 has a plain meaning that can be interpreted without
an evaluation of the purposes of the Rule. This conclusion is typical of a
variety of cases using plain meaning analysis to interpret statutes. 178
Justice Marshall's approach to the issues in Pavelic contrasted
sharply. Eschewing a simple plain meaning analysis, Justice Marshall
first demonstrated that the Court's interpretation was not the only rea-
sonable interpretation consistent with the text of the Rule. 7 9 According
to Justice Marshall, an interpretation of the Rule's phrase "the person
who signed" that encompassed all persons, including legal entities such
as partnerships, was just as plausible as the majority's restrictive inter-
175. Id.
176. Id. at 127.
177. In some ways, the broadening of the textual analysis to encompass consideration of
the Rule as a whole resembles the structuralist analysis of statutes described by then-Judge
Kenneth Starr. See Kenneth W. Starr, Of Forests and Trees: Structuralism in the Interpreta-
tion of Statutes, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 706 (1988) (advocating structuralist approach to
interpreting statutes).
178. See Schauer, supra note 158, at 242-45.
179. Pavelic, 493 U.S. at 128-29 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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pretation, and was consistent with the Rule's broad purposes. 180 Justice
Marshall contended that the policy of Rule 11 permitting trial judges
great flexibility in imposing sanctions for abusive filings would be best
served by allowing the trial judge the opportunity to-decide the appropri-
ate sanctions in a given case. Unlike the majority, Justice Marshall re-
ferred several times to the. Advisory Committee's Notes
. 
on Rule 11 to
bolster his conclusion that Rule 11 should be read to permit flexibility on
the part of trial judges.181
Later during the same Term, the Court considered three other as-
pects of Rule 11 in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. 182 Although super-
ficially endorsing the plain meaning analysis of Pavelic & LeFlore, the
Court appeared to be much more sensitive to allowing policy and other
considerations to inform its analysis. Justice O'Connor, writing for a
unanimous Court on this issue, stated: "We... interpret Rule 11 ac-
cording to its plain meaning, see Pavelic & Leore ... in light of the
scope of the congressional authorization [in the Rules Enabling Act]. ' 183
She then noted that the Rule must be interpreted in light of the problems
encountered under the prior version of Rule 11 and in light of the central
purpose of the 1983 version-to deter abusive filings in the district
courts. 184 As contrasted with the rigid textual analysis of Justice Scalia,
this seems to be a much more comprehensive and flexible approach; yet
none of the Justices, not even -Justice Scalia, 'expressed difficulty in
switching to the more reasoned tenor.
In resolving three separate issues concerning the application of Rule
11, the Court in Cooter & Gell stressed the policy implications and pur-
poses of the Rule. The Court concluded that a district court had the
power to impose Rule 11 sanctions after the filing of a notice of voluntary
dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) because such power was consistent with
the policies of both Rules to deter abuses of the judicial system. 185 The
180. Id. at 127-29.
181. Id. at 130.
182. 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
183. Id at 391 (emphasis added). All Justices joined the opinion, but Justice Stevens dis-
sented with respect to one part of the opinion. No other Justices wrote separate opinions.
184. Id at 392-95.
185. The Court cited a variety of sources, including comments from members of the Advi-
sory Committee, supporting its analysis of the purposes and policies behind Rules 11 and
41(a)(1). Id Interestingly, the Court noted Rule 1l's silence concerning a time frame for
ordering sanctions and then cited Advisory Committee comments suggesting sanctions should
usually quickly follow disposition. d at 398. Nonetheless, the Court approved the imposition
of sanctions in this case more than three years after the voluntary dismissal. Id at 409. The
Court did not suggest any specific reason for making an exception to the usual desirability of
timeliness in imposing sanctions. Id at 398.
Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion dissenting with regard to this portion of the
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Court also concluded that the terms of Rule 11, which state that a dis-
trict judge "shall impose" sanctions for violations, were consistent with
this interpretation. On the second issue, the Court again focused on the
purposes and policies of Rule 11 to conclude that a reviewing court
should apply an abuse of discretion standard of review for all aspects of a
trial court's Rule 11 decision.18 6 Finally, the Court concluded, attorney's
fees were not available under Rule 11 for the expenses of defending a
Rule 11 award on appeal on the grounds that limiting the applicability of
sanctions to proceedings in the district court was consistent with the lan-
guage of Rule 11, the Advisory Committee Notes, the interplay between
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and basic policy considerations. 187
The issue of whether the opinion in Cooter & Gell signalled that the
Supreme Court was backing away from a strict plain meaning analysis in
Rule 11 cases, or that there simply was not precise enough language to
resolve the problems presented, was resolved the next Term in Business
Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc.1 88 In a five
to four opinion, the Court again endorsed a plain meaning analysis, refer-
ring numerous times to the plain meaning of the terms of Rule 11 and
rejecting any alternative readings of the language as less plausible or less
natural from a textual perspective.1 89 In an amazing shift of position, the
majority opinion, with its emphasis on a plain meaning analysis, was
written by Justice O'Connor. The dissent, written by Justice Kennedy,
was joined by Justices Marshall, Stevens, and in part by Justice Scalia.' 90
opinion. Id. at 409-13. Based on a profoundly different evaluation of competing policies moti-
vating the two Rules and of the consequences of undertaking a Rule 11 proceeding when a
complaint was voluntarily dismissed before any judicial involvement in the case, he argued
that Rule 11 sanctions could not be imposed after a Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal. Id.
186. Justice O'Connor wrote:
Rule lI's policy goals also support adopting an abuse-of-discretion standard. The
district court is best acquainted with the local bar's litigation practices and thus best
situated to determine when a sanction is warranted to serve Rule 1 's goal of specific
and general deterrence .... In light of our consideration of the purposes and policies
of Rule 11 . . . an appellate court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in
reviewing all aspects of a district court's Rule 11 determination.
Id. at 404-05.
187. Id. at 405-09.
188. 498 U.S. 533 (1991).
189. For example, the majority opinion states, inter alia: "the meaning of the Rule seems
plain," id. at 541; "[w]e find nothing in the full text of the Rule that detracts from the plain
meaning of the relevant portion quoted initially," id. at 542; "[t]he plain language of the Rule
again provides the answer," id. at 548; and "[g]iving the text its plain meaning ... ," id. at 551.
190. Justice Scalia did not write separately to explain why he joined the dissent, or why he
refrained from joining the portion of the dissent addressing rulemaking power concerns.
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The reason for the shifting of coalitions is unexpressed and un-
clear.191
The issue in Business Guides was whether Rule 11 requires repre-
sented parties who sign papers to satisfy an objective standard of reason-
able inquiry into the factual basis for the papers. Rule 11 provides:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the
signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper;
that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is war-
ranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law .... 192
According to Justice O'Connor, writing for five Justices, the meaning of
this sentence is plain: Parties, as well as counsel, shall be sanctioned if
they sign papers without first undertaking a reasonable inquiry into their
factual and legal basis. These mandatory sanctions apply to signing par-
ties even though parties who are represented by counsel are not required
to sign most documents. 193
Justice O'Connor also applied plain meaning analysis to conclude
that a single objective standard, requiring a reasonable inquiry into the
facts and law before signing a paper, applies both to counsel and to par-
ties. 194 Rejecting an argument that a subjective bad faith standard was
more appropriate for evaluating parties' conduct, Justice O'Connor
wrote, "[T]his Court is not acting on a clean slate; our task is not to
decide what the rule should be, but rather to determine what it is. Once
we conclude that Rule 11 speaks to the matter at issue, our inquiry is
complete."' 95 Although Rule 11 had previously used a subjective stan-
191. Cf Schauer, supra note 158, at 246 (concluding that plain meaning doctrine domi-
nates the Court's statutory interpretation cases and is used not only when Justice Scalia is in
the majority, but also by majorities even when Justice Scalia dissents).
192. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
193. Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 543-48. In this case the district court had found that the
client had failed to undertake a reasonable inquiry into the facts before signing the initial
application for a temporary restraining order and before filing a supplemental affidavit signed
by the client's director of research. Id at 538. The district court also determined that the
counsel should be sanctioned for failing to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts after
being notified of their inaccuracy, and that both the client's and the law firm's conduct in
evidentiary hearings before a magistrate violated Rule 11. Id at 538-39. Because the law firm
(Finley, Kumble et aL) had dissolved and was subject to bankruptcy proceedings, the opposing
counsel's request to withdraw its motion for sanctions against Finley, Kumble et aL was
granted by the district judge without prejudice to its subsequent renewal. Id at 539. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court decision and held that the client failed to meet the
required objective standard of reasonable inquiry into the factual basis for its TRO application
and the supplemental affidavit. Id at 540. However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that sanc-
tions for the conduct at the evidentiary hearing were inappropriate. Id.
194. Id at 549-50.
195. Id at 549.
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dard, the 1983 amendments drafted by the Advisory Committee that ex-
panded coverage to include parties also switched the standard to an
objective one. 196 According to Justice O'Connor, "[e]ven if we were con-
vinced that a subjective bad faith standard would more effectively pro-
mote the goals of Rule 11, we would not be free to implement this
standard outside of the rulemaking process. 'Our task is to apply the
text, not to improve upon it.' ,,197
Despite its reliance on plain meaning analysis, the majority sug-
gested that policy considerations, if relevant, would support its conclu-
sion. The majority believed the client should be required to make a
reasonable inquiry into the facts because often the client would be better
able than the attorney to investigate the facts.198  With respect to the
party's duty to make a reasonable inquiry into the legal basis for a paper,
Justice O'Connor noted that the Advisory Committee Notes establish a
standard of "reasonableness under the circumstances." 199 Thus, the
Court held that the Rule provides the applicable test: All signers,
whether attorneys or parties, should be held to an objective standard of
reasonable inquiry that may vary with the circumstances. 2°°
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, focused on in-
terpreting the key sentence of Rule 11 in the context of the entire Rule.
Referring to the approach used in Pavelic & LeFlore, Justice Kennedy
concluded the text of Rule 11 as a whole demonstrated that the drafters
sought to mandate a reasonable inquiry into the basis of a paper only by
those whose signatures were required by the Rule.20 1 His conclusion,
196. Id.
197. Id. (quoting Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 126).
198. Id
199. Id. at 551 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules-1983
Amendment, 28 U.S.C. app. at 576 (1988)).
200. Id. The majority also concluded that this component of Rule 11 did not violate the
principles of the Rules Enabling Act. It noted that Rule 11 "is reasonably necessary to main-
tain the integrity of the system of federal practice and procedure, and that any effect on sub-
stantive rights is incidental." Id. at 552. Moreover, the Rule did not create a federal common
law of malicious prosecution, but was designed to deter abusive practice. Id. at 553.
201. Id. at 556 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy's textual analysis began by
noting that the first two sentences of the Rule require the signature of the attorney for a repre-
sented party, or of an unrepresented party itself. Id. at 555. The consequences of these signa-
tures are spelled out in the Rule; however, signatures of represented parties are not
contemplated by the Rule. Id. Moreover, the last sentence of the Rule, authorizing sanctions
on "the person who signed, a represented party, or both" suggested to Justice Kennedy that
the person who signs is separate from the represented party. Id. at 556 (quoting FED. R. Civ.
P. 11).
Justice Kennedy also noted a conflict between the decision in Business Guides and that in
Pavelic & LeFlore. Id. at 563. In Pavelic & LeFlore, the Court concluded that only the indi-
vidual signer could be sanctioned, not the law firm of the attorney. Id. Yet in Business Guides,
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based on the certification requirement, pertains to attorneys and unrepre-
sented parties, but not to represented parties whose signatures are not
required. Extending the Rule to impose a reasonable inquiry upon repre-
sented parties who have voluntarily signed papers constituted an unnec-
essary extension of the Rule, unsupported by either the purpose of the
Rule or the Advisory Committee Notes.202 Moreover, the majority's im-
position of duties on represented parties who voluntarily sign papers cre-
ates a trap for the ill-advised client.20 3
Justice Kennedy's dissent also analyzed the implications of the ma-
jority's subjecting of verified complaints and affidavits to the require-
ments of Rule 11. Rule 11 itself abolished verification or affidavit
requirements unless otherwise provided by rule or statute. Because
wrongful verification could already be sanctioned in a prosecution for
perjury, additional Rule 11 sanctions were unnecessary, and indeed were
not addressed specifically in the Rule.20 4 The majority's inclusion of affi-
davits within the scope of Rule lI 's language applying to "pleadings,
motions, or other papers," would result in every represented party's affi-
davits requiring the signature of the attorney as well as the party.20 5
Moreover, by imposing Rule 11 on affidavits submitted in support of
summary judgment motions, the majority rendered Rule 56(g) sanc-
tions for bad faith affidavits20 6 irrelevant and unnecessary, 20 7 even
the Court concluded that the signature of an individual employee of the represented corporate
client would result in the imposition of sanctions for violations of Rule 11 on the corporation
itself. Id According to Justice Kennedy, "signer" should mean the individual signer, whether
referring to the attorney or to the represented party. Id at 563-64.
202. Id at 555-58. Justice Kennedy believed that the purpose of the Rule was to control
litigation abuse by counsel. Id at 556. In 1983, unrepresented parties were brought within the
ambit of the Rule to ensure that every paper fied in court was signed by someone having a
duty of reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal basis for the paper. I.d at 558. These
purposes would not require represented parties to be governed by the same certification re-
quirements. Id.
The Advisory Committee Notes were also interpreted by Justice Kennedy as supporting
his conclusion that the reasonable inquiry requirement pertains only to counsel and. unrepre-
sented parties. Id at 559. Not only do the Notes fail to specify that represented parties may
be sanctioned for their own signatures, but they also imply that represented parties can be
sanctioned when their attorneys violate the Rule. Id (quoting Notes of Advisory Committee
on Rules-1983 Amendment, 28 U.S.C. app. at 575-76 (1988)).
203. Id at 560.
204. Id at 561-62.
205. Id at 562.
206. Rule 56(g) requires that a party shown to have submitted affidavits in bad faith or
solely for delay shall be ordered to pay reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred
as a result by the other party. See infra text accompanying notes 284-285.
207. 498 U.S. at 562.
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though one Rule should not be read to render another Rule super-
flUOUS. 2 0 8
Justice Kennedy also raised the federalism and separation of powers
concerns of the Rules Enabling Act as prudential factors supporting his
interpretation of the language of Rule 11. According to Justice Ken-
nedy, the majority's application of an objective standard of inquiry to a
represented party has the effect of operating like an attorney fee-shifting
provision that potentially deters meritorious suits. 2°9 Such an effect
should be left to Congress to legislate, rather than implied by the Court
when the scope of the Rule is uncertain.210 Moreover, by going well be-
yond the state tort law causes of action of malicious prosecution and
abuse of process, the majority's interpretation implicates federalism con-
cerns. 21 1 Based on these concerns, Justice Kennedy concluded that the
Rule and its objective standard of reasonable inquiry should not be read
to apply to represented parties. 212 Instead, those parties should simply
be governed by "some subjective bad-faith standard. '21 3
These three recent Rule 11 decisions demonstrate the pitfalls of
plain meaning analysis and suggest some factors that the Court should
employ to interpret the Rules. First, as the two primary dissents in
Pavelic & LeFlore and Business Guides indicate, the meaning of a particu-
lar provision in a Rule is often not plain. When there is legitimate disa-
greement about the meaning of a Rule provision, the proper resolution is
not to assert that the meaning is plain or clear, but rather to analyze the
implications of the different readings of the Rule's language. In other
words, it is not appropriate or adequate to focus exclusively on a plain
meaning analysis, except in those rare cases in which the Rule's text is
unquestionably explicit with respect to the issue in question.
Second, recognizing the usual complexity of a Rule's language, the
Court must interpret the text of a Rule in light of its conformity with
other aspects of the particular Rule, and the Rules as a whole. Even if a
Rule is acknowledgedly explicit on a particular point, the Rule may still
have to be read in light of the policies and purposes behind that particu-
208. Id.
209. Id. at 566.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 566. Justice Scalia did not join the portion of the dissenting opinion addressing
federalism and separation of powers concerns. However, he joined the remainder of Justice
Kennedy's opinion and did not write separately.
212. Id. at 570.
213. Id. Justice Scalia joined in the portion of the dissent concluding that represented
parties should not be sanctioned when they have acted in good faith. The dissenters also
concluded that there was no attorney violation of Rule 11 in the case. Id. at 569.
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lar Rule and the Federal Rules in general in order to avoid absurdities or
to achieve just results. 214 In undertaking this analysis, the Court should
not shy away from its responsibility to develop a cohesive civil procedure
framework in order to achieve the systemic goals of fair, efficient, and
just litigation. Indeed, because the Court is interpreting Rules that are
supposed to be at least in part its own work product, such interpretation
does not implicate congressional powers in the way that statutory inter-
pretation does. Except for instances in which it may be exceeding its
power under the Rules Enabling Act, the Court has a clear duty to deter-
mine, within the framework of the particular Rule and the Federal Rules
as a whole, how best to effectuate the various and sometimes competing
policy interests involved.
B. Recent Analysis of Procedural Statutes by the Court Using Plain
Meaning Doctrine
Why has the Court adopted a plain meaning analysis in Rule 11 and
other Federal Rule cases? The most likely explanation is the Court has
simply decided to apply the plain meaning analysis that it has developed
in the context of statutory interpretation. This decision is misguided,
unwarranted, and inappropriate.
The development of the plain meaning doctrine in the general statu-
tory arena has been well documented and critiqued.215 Its recent use in
the context of statutes with a procedural orientation is worth special at-
tention here, for it is in this context that the doctrine is arguably most
relevant to guide interpretation of the Federal Rules. 216
The dispute between plain meaning enthusiasts and those who
would also consider policy issues in determining the contextual meaning
of a statutory procedural provision is most graphically illustrated in the
recent decision of West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey.21 7
The issue before the Court was whether the prevailing party in a
214. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989) (all Justices refusing to
apply plain language of Federal Rule of Evidence).
215. See generally Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 157; Schauer, supra note 158, at
238 (analyzing all cases involving statutory construction decided by Court in 1989 Term and
concluding that there is "a consistent theme of taking the plain meaning of statutory terms as
dispositive if clear, and primary even if not"); Wald, Sizzling Sleeper, supra note 159.
216. This Article focuses on the relatively recent cases. Other commentators have also
noted the unwarranted application of the plain meaning doctrine to procedural statutes. See,
e.g., Douglas A. Kahn, The Supreme Court's Misconstruction of a Procedural Statute-A Cri-
tique of the Court's Decision in Badaracco, 82 MICH. L. Rnv. 461 (1983) (criticizing applica-
tion of the plain meaning doctrine to resolve question of limitations period in a tax case).
217. Ill S. Ct. 1138 (1991).
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§ 1983218 action could recover fees paid to experts hired to help prepare
the lawsuit and to testify, pursuant to § 1988's allowance of an award of
"a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. ' 219 A separate statutory
provision authorized a judge to tax as costs certain items, including
"[flees and disbursements for... witnesses," 220 and a further provision
limited the amount of witness fees to $30 per day.221 Under a prior deci-
sion, Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc.,222 the Court had held the
latter two statutory provisions expressed Congress's intent to authorize a
shift of litigation costs, and any further shifting would require "explicit
statutory authority. '223 In West Virginia Hospitals, the six Justice major-
ity opinion, written by Justice Scalia, found no authority in § 1988 to
shift expert fees. Therefore, the Court limited the shifting to $30 per day,
applicable only to experts who testified and only for their time testify-
ing.224 According to the majority, § 1988 only authorized the shifting of
attorney's fees, and should not be interpreted to include expert fees as
part of attorney's fees.
Simply put, the majority opinion rejected all arguments in favor of
reading the language "attorney's fees" in § 1988 to include expert fees.
First, the majority catalogued a variety of fee-shifting statutes that re-
ferred separately to attorney's fees and to expert fees, and concluded this
"record of statutory usage demonstrates convincingly that attorney's fees
and expert fees are regarded as separate elements of litigation cost. '225
Second, the majority could not find a single case in which a court had
interpreted the term "attorney's fees" to include expert fees.226 Finally,
in the most significant part of the opinion, Justice Scalia and the majority
rejected the argument that the congressional purpose behind § 1988
218. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
220. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(3) (1988).
221. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) (1988).
222. 482 U.S. 437 (1987).
223. Id. at 439. Crawford Fitting involved the question of whether a prevailing party
could obtain more than the $30 fee for amounts paid to its own expert witnesses. This issue is
arguably distinguishable from the issue in West Virginia Univ. Hosps., since explicit statutory
language limited witness fees to $30 per day in Crawford Fitting. Of course, one could wonder
whether Congress intended the $30 limit to pertain to expert witnesses, who are known gener-
ally to charge more than $30 per hour.
224. 111 S. Ct. at 1148.
225. Id. at 1141. The Court remarked that if attorney's fees were held to include expert
fees, "dozens of statutes referring to the two separately become an inexplicable exercise in
redundancy." Id. at 1143.
226. Id. at 1143-46. The majority acknowledged that in some cases courts had allowed
shifting of expert fees, but concluded that this was a separate exercise of those courts' equitable
powers, not a conclusion by those courts that attorney's fees included expert fees. Id
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should be considered in determining the meaning of the term "attorney's
fees" within the statute. Justice Scalia wrote:
The best evidence of [congressional] purpose is the statutory text
adopted by both Houses of Congress' and submitted to the President.
Where that contains a phrase that is unambiguous-that has a clearly
accepted meaning in both legislative and judicial practice-we do not
permit it to be expanded or contracted by the statements of individual
legislators or committees during the course of the enactment process.
Congress could easily have shifted "attorney's fees and expert witness
fees," or "reasonable litigation expenses," as it did in contemporaneous
statutes; it chose instead to enact more restrictive language, and we are
bound by that restriction. 27
Justice Scalia also addressed what the Court's proper role would be
if subsequent legislation were to include expert fees explicitly. Ex-
panding on Justice Brandeis' admonition that "[t]o supply omissions
transcends the judicial function," 228 Justice Scalia concluded that it was
inappropriate for the Court to usurp Congress's power by determining
that Congress simply forgot to provide explicitly for expert fees when it
enacted § 1988.229
The primary dissent, eschewing the literalist approach, also drew
upon the words of a great judge for guidance in interpreting the statute.
Justice Stevens quoted Judge Learned Hand's observations:
All [legislators] have done is to write down certain words which they
mean to apply generally to situations of that kind. To apply these liter-
ally may either pervert what was plainly their general meaning, or
leave undisposed of what there is every reason to suppose they meant
to provide for. Thus it is not enough for the judge just to use a diction-
ary. If he should do no more, he might come out with a result which
every sensible man would recognize to be quite the opposite of what
was really intended; which would contradict or leave unfulfilled its
plain purpose.230
Evidence of the purposes of Congress-to preserve access to the courts,
to encourage public interest litigation, and to make the prevailing party
whole-as well as examination of the historical context, led the dissent to
conclude that the prevailing party should be fully compensated for expert
227. Id. at 1147 (citations omitted).
228. Id at 1148 (quoting Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926)).
229. Id
230. Id at 1155 (quoting Learned Hand, How Far Is a Judge Free in Rendering a Deci-
sion?, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 103, 106 (Irving Dilhiard ed., 1952)). Justice Stevens' opin-
ion was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. Justice Marshall also wrote a separate
dissenting opinion, in which he observed that the literalist approach of the majority usurped




fees under a proper interpretation of § 1988.231 The dissent analogized a
literalist interpretation here to situations in which Congress has subse-
quently acted to overturn the Court's interpretation. 232
Other 1991 decisions also relied on plain meaning doctrine to vary-
ing degrees when analyzing procedural statutes. One of these,
Melkonyan v. Sullivan,233 was written by Justice O'Connor for a unani-
mous Court. Melkonyan concerned the Equal Access to Justice Act,
which permits an award of attorney's fees in a civil action to a party who
prevails against the United States in certain circumstances if the prevail-
ing party submits an application for fees "within thirty days of final judg-
ment in the action. ' 234 The precise question in the case was whether an
administrative decision issued upon remand from the district court is a
final judgment within the meaning of the statute. The statute describes a
final judgment as one "that is final and not appealable. '235 The Court
held that the requirement of filing within thirty days of "final judgment
in the action' plainly refers back to the civil action ... in any court' in
(d)(1)(A). The plain language makes clear that a final judgment' under
§ 2412 can only be the judgment of a court of law."'236 The Court termed
this the most natural reading, and viewed this as an "unambiguous re-
quirement of judgment by a court. ' 237 With respect to another issue con-
231. Id. at 1151-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232. See id. at 1154-55 for illustrations of literalist interpretations of statutes by the Court,
followed by congressional action to repudiate the Court's interpretation. Cf William N. Es-
kridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331
(1991) (describing and analyzing congressional efforts to override Court statutory interpreta-
tion decisions).
233. 111 S. Ct. 2157 (1991).
234. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1988). This section follows the portion of the statute au-
thorizing an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party for fees "incurred by that party in
any civil action... brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of
that action." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
235. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G) (1988).
236. 111 S. Ct. at 2161 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1)(A), 2412(d)(1)(B), and
2412(d)(2)(G)).
237. Id. at 2162. The Court also contrasted this statutory language with that of another
provision in the statute, 5 U.S.C. § 504(a). That language provides for an award of attorney's
fees for administrative proceedings held prior to court action if an application is filed "within
thirty days of a final disposition in the adversary adjudication." 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2) (1988).
According to Justice O'Connor, Congress clearly meant "final judgment by a court" in the
provision referring to a "final judgment in the action." 111 S. Ct. at 2161.
The Court also analyzed Congress's 1985 amendment of the statute that defined a final
judgment as one that is "final and not appealable" in contrast with the normal definition as one
that is final and appealable. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G)). This provision was ad-
ded to resolve a lower court conflict regarding whether the thirty day period began to run from
the date of entry of a final judgment or from the expiration date for the time for taking an
appeal from that judgment. 111 S. Ct. at 2162. Congress's decision to adopt the latter require-
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cerning the scope of the district court's remand powers, the Melkonyan
Court also employed a plain meaning analysis, bolstered by reference to
the legislative history.238
Despite the Court's frequent use of plain meaning analysis in 1991,
two unanimous 1991 decisions considered matters beyond plain meaning
to interpret procedurally oriented statutes. One case, International Pri-
mate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, 239
concerned whether a federal agency could remove a case to federal court
pursuant to a federal statute that permits removal by a defendant who is
[a]ny officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or person act-
ig under him, for any act under color of such office or on account of
any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the
apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the
revenue.
24°
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Marshall,241 the Court concluded only
an officer and not an agency of the United States could remove a case to
federal court.242 The Court essentially relied on the language, structure,
and grammar of the statute to reach this conclusion. Believing the statu-
tory language excluded agencies from the scope of the removal power,
the Court also analyzed the punctuation of the statute, subsequent phra-
seology in the statute, the legislative history, and the statute's context to
reach its conclusion. 24 3
ment had no effect on the question of whether the statute referred only to final judgments of
courts or also to decisions of administrative agencies. Id. at 2162.
238. Id at 2164. The Court concluded that Congress intended to limit remands to the two
situations specified in the statute. The Court based its conclusion on the "plain language of
§ 405(g) . . .supported by the legislative history," id, and stated that the structure of the
statute and the legislative history show "Congress' clear intent to limit courts to two kinds of
remands in these cases." Id at 2165.
239. 111 S. Ct. 1700 (1991).
240. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1988).
241. Justice Scalia did not participate.
242. 111 S. Ct. at 1705.
243. Justice Marshall began with a narrow focus on the statutory language and then
broadened his analysis. He wrote:
The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language
itself .... We continue to recognize that context is important in the quest for [a]
word's meaning... and that [s]tatutory construction is a holistic endeavor. We find
that, when construed in the relevant context, the first clause of § 1442(a)(1) grants
removal power to only one grammatical subject, "[a]ny officer," which is then modi-
fied by a compound prepositional phrase: "of the United States or [of] any agency
thereof."
Several features of § 1442(a)(1)'s grammar and language support this reading.
The first is the statute's punctuation .... Secondly, the language that follows "[a]ny
officer of the United States or any agency thereof" confirms our reading of that
clause.
Ill S. Ct. at 1705-06 (citations omitted). The opinion proceeded to consider Congress's inten-
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In Kay v. Ehrler,244 the Court construed a procedural statute with-
out relying on the plain meaning doctrine. Kay addressed whether the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 authorized an award of
attorney's fees to an attorney who represented himself in a successful
civil rights case. The relevant statute245 was silent with regard to this
question, and the Court viewed the legislative history as unclear. 246 The
Court was therefore forced to consider policy issues, but did so tersely,
concluding that the purpose of Congress was to ensure effective prosecu-
tion of meritorious civil rights claims and that this could best be accom-
plished by awarding attorney's fees only to independent counsel and not
to pro se litigants who happen to be attorneys. 247 Since the statute was
silent on this issue, plain meaning analysis could not be used.
The foregoing two cases demonstrate that the Court may occasion-
ally look beyond a close textual interpretation of procedural statutes. 248
However, in the arena of procedural statutes, it is in general fair to con-
clude that the Court has warmly embraced plain meaning analysis. Jus-
tion when it enacted the statute and concluded that there was no persuasive evidence that
Congress intended for agencies to be able to remove suits to federal court. Furthermore, the
Court reasoned, Congress could rationally have intended that officers but not agencies be pro-
vided with the removal power because of the complexities involved in deciding the scope of the
individual's official immunity defenses. Id. at 1707-09.
The Court remanded to the district court with instructions to remand the case to the state
court pursuant to § 1447(c), which requires remand to state court whenever it appears that the
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case. Id. at 1709-10. The Court
cited approvingly a case from the First Circuit which stated that "'the literal words of
§ 1447(c).... on their face, give... no discretion to dismiss rather than remand an action.'"
Id. at 1710 (quoting Maine Ass'n of Interdependent Neighborhoods v. Comm'r, Maine Dep't
of Human Servs., 876 F.2d 1051, 1054 (1st Cir. 1989)). This portion of the opinion uses solely
a literalist approach.
244. 111 S. Ct. 1435 (1991).
245. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
246. 111 S. Ct. at 1437. Justice Stevens wrote for a unanimous Court: "We do not think
either the text of the statute or its legislative history provides a clear answer." Id. He then
quoted legislative history suggesting that the purpose of Congress was to provide victims of
civil rights violations with effective access to the judicial system. Id.
247. Id. at 1438. Justice Stevens' policy analysis really boiled down to the adage that "'a
lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client.' " Id. Prosecution of meritorious claims
would best be served, he concluded, by a rule that encouraged parties to retain counsel, even
when the party was an attorney. These policy judgments were reached on the basis of the
Court's own evaluation of factors, rather than on policy analysis of the bar, academics, or
others outside the Court. Id.
248. See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme
Court's Role as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
720 (1988) (analyzing Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988), as a case in
which the Court read statutory language expansively and allowed remand to a state court
when the federal remand statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), did not prohibit remand; interpreting
Congress's silence as not voiding the judiciary's power to remand).
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tice Scalia's opinion for the Court in West Virginia University Hospitals
demonstrates the powerful attraction of the plain meaning analysis to
members of the current Court in the context of procedural statutes.
C. Rejection of Dependence on Plain Meaning Analysis for Interpretation
of Federal Rules
As we have seen, the plain meaning approach to interpreting stat-
utes, endorsed by Justice Scalia and applied recently by a shifting major-
ity of the Court,249 requires narrow focus on a statute's text. It rejects
inquiry into legislative intent and legislative history, in part because legis-
lative intent is difficult if not impossible to ascertain, 250 and in part be-
cause legislative history is subject to manipulation by both members of
Congress and committee staffs. 251 Justice Scalia's argument also rests on
the constitutional requirements that Congress may act only by passing
statutes, and that neither legislative intent nor legislative history consti-
tutes a statute under Article 1.252
This plain meaning or textualist approach fails to recognize that leg-
islative intent and legislative history can be important resources for un-
derstanding what Congress meant in its enactment of particular statutory
language. 253 In most instances, the meaning of a statute must be derived
249. Cf Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal
Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827, 833 (1991) (stating that Justices Scalia and Kennedy
are firmly attached to the plain meaning doctrine and are often joined by Justice White, Justice
O'Connor, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, but concluding that it is too early to determine
whether this will be the dominant analysis); Schauer, supra note 158, at 248-49 (arguing that
all Justices view plain meaning analysis as a strong factor in their decisional process, especially
in duller, less policy charged cases).
250. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring);
see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domain, 50 U. CHi. L. REv. 533, 547 (1983) [herein-
after Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain] (stating that legislatures do not have "intents" because
they are composed of many individuals); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of
Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L. J. 371, 375 (stating that a statute expresses the intent of
Congress as a whole).
251. See, e.g., Stock, supra note 41 (describing and criticizing Justice Scalia's textualist
approach toward statutory interpretation); see also Note, Rejecting Legislative History, supra
note 41 (discussing issue of manipulability of committees).
252. See generally (in addition to Justice Scalia's opinions cited earlier) Frank H. Easter-
brook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, I1 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59,
61-66 (1988) (arguing that reliance on intent constitutes an end run around the constitutional
process for legislation); Farber & Frickey, supra note 41, at 454-61 (describing and criticizing
Justice Scalia's rationale for rejecting legislative intent and legislative history); Stock, supra
note 41, at 165-68 (describing Justice Scalia's use of separation-of-powers doctrine as a justifi-
cation for prohibiting the use of legislative history).
253. See generally Farber & Frickey, supra note 41, at 448-52 (criticizing Justice Scalia's
refusal to consider legislative intent and legislative history, arguing that public choice theory
warrants a flexible approach to statutory construction which includes evaluation of legislative
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not only from its text, but also from a more general context. This more
general context should include consideration of the legislative history (in-
cluding committee reports and other expressions of legislative intent), the
relationship of the provision to the statute as a whole and to other stat-
utes, and the policy and purpose furthered by the statute. The plain
meaning doctrine focuses narrowly on the text of a provision and is
guided more by general dictionaries than by legislative history and in-
tent. This focus results in an unduly crabbed approach to interpreting
statutes that ignores much of the relevant and rich context in which they
were enacted. 254
The asserted justifications of Justice Scalia and others for the textu-
alist focus in interpreting statutes become less persuasive when the Court
is interpreting the Federal Rules. 255 Significantly, there is no separation
of powers concern if the Court includes an analysis of purpose and policy
in interpreting the Rules. As is discussed in Part I of this Article, Con-
gress has given the Court a role in the promulgation of the Rules through
the Rules Enabling Act: The Court has the power to promulgate Rules,
subject to the possibility that Congress may override a rule by statute.
Thus, when interpreting the Rules, the Court, pursuant to a delegation
from Congress, is acting under its own Article III powers,256 and is not
interfering with Congress's own separate powers. Restricting the Court's
intent); Mikva, supra note 41, at 386 (stating that a judge should use all tools available when
interpreting a statute).
254. The modem literature on statutory construction is growing exponentially and reflects
enormous diversity. In addition to the sources cited passim, an array of other viewpoints
should be recognized. These include the views of Dean Calabresi and Professor Eskridge, who
each urge courts to go beyond legislative history and intent to consider and evaluate the cur-
rent context. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987).
These recommendations for judicial evaluation of current needs are evaluated in Nicholas S.
Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353 (1989). See also Sun-
stein, supra note 167 (criticizing textualism, but also criticizing the traditional contextual ap-
proach and providing his own set of interpretative principles); Note, Intent, Clear Statements,
and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892,
914 (1982) (advocating a common law interpretation approach that would allow a court to
"look to the age of a statute, the risks of alternative interpretations, the specificity of a statu-
tory scheme, the likelihood that Congress both foresaw and spoke to the particular controversy
before the court, and more generally, the demands of statutory integration, . . . and social goals
and policies that have come into existence since a particular statute was passed").
255. Other justifications are also inappropriate in the Rules context. Thus, for example,
Professor Schauer, supra note 158, at 254, justifies the use of the plain meaning analysis as a
"suboptim[al] second-best solution" appropriately used when the Justices lack expertise in the
subject area. However, as lawyers, judges, and participants in the promulgation process, the
Justices do have some expertise in the subject matters of the Rules.
256. See Bauer, supra note 248, at 729 (concluding that there are no separation of powers
problems raised by Court's interpretation of Rules). See generally Harold J. Krent, Separating
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power to interpret the Rules by limiting consideration of purpose and
policy would unreasonably constrain the judicial branch and potentially
interfere with the powers of the judiciary. 257
Beyond separation of powers concerns, the Court's role in promul-
gating the Rules is relevant to the power it has in interpreting the Rules.
The Rules Enabling Act provides the Court a unique role in rulemaking
that is not paralleled in the creation of statutes. The judiciary plays no
role in statutory promulgation; statutes are passed by the House and Sen-
ate and approved by the President. Although the Court's actual role in
the rulemaking process is relatively minimal, nonetheless the Court must
at least approve the proposed Rules before they are transmitted to
Congress.
Thus, the Court's imprimatur is placed on the Rules; the Court has
an opportunity to reject whatever Rules it believes are inappropriate and
to provide further clarification, detail, or changes of any kind to the pro-
posed Rules. Given these substantial, although largely unexercised, pow-
ers of the Court in the promulgation process, a more activist role in the
interpretative stage, one that considers purpose and policy, is appropri-
ate.258 Congress has explicitly delegated to the Court rulemaking power,
and it is not inconsistent to imply the Court has greater power to inter-
pret Rules than it does to interpret statutes.
It is useful to compare the proper roles of legislative history in the
context of statutory and rule interpretation. In the rules context, the
legislative history consists of the comments of the Advisory Committee
and the other bodies involved in the promulgation process; in other
words, the legislative history is really rulemaking history. There is rarely
any actual legislative history from Congress concerning a Rule. How-
ever, the 1988 legislation requires that each committee and group explain
the reasons for its positions and provide an explanation of minority and
other views.259 Thus, in the future there is likely to be more extensive
rulemaking history from the bodies that have drafted a new Rule or
amendment.
the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REv. 1253, 1298-1316 (analyzing
limits on judiciary that are imposed by separation of powers doctrine).
257. The refusal to consider the purposes and policies behind the Rules would also freeze
the Rules into a more rigid state than is necessary or intended. Cf FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (provid-
ing that the Rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion of every action").
258. Cf Bauer, supra note 248, at 728 (suggesting that the Court should have broad free-
dom in interpreting the Rules that it has itself created, and that it "need ask no more than
what the promulgating authority itself sought to accomplish").
259. See supra note 110.
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This rulemaking history should not be ignored, for it provides useful
information regarding the drafters' understanding of the purposes and
policies behind the Rule. However, this rulemaking history does not
have the same weight that nontextualists give to the legislative history of
a statute.26° Since, absent action by Congress, the Court itself is the final
stage in the promulgation process for the Rules, the views of lower bodies
merely constitute useful information regarding purposes and policies. It
is possible that the Court, in adopting a particular Rule, had a different
view of purpose or policy that may or may not have been expressed pub-
licly and that should be considered when interpreting a Rule. The Court
should not be bound by the expressions regarding purpose or policy by
the lower bodies,261 but it should certainly be informed by those
expressions.
Because the refusal to consider the purposes behind the Rules would
freeze them into an unreasonably rigid state, the plain meaning analysis
should be rejected as the model for the interpretation of the Federal
Rules. The plain meaning doctrine tends to preclude the useful evalua-
tion of policy and purpose in determining the meaning and application of
the Rules.262 Affording the Court flexibility in considering policy is par-
ticularly important when the issue in a case concerns matters unantici-
pated at the time of the framing of the Rule. Of course, this factor is
important in statutory construction as well, but again the Court's dual
roles as promulgator and interpreter make flexibility at the interpretation
260. See Bauer, supra note 248, at 728-29 (arguing that the views of the Advisory Commit-
tee are entitled to limited weight, similar to the opinions of distinguished scholars or judges).
261. The 1988 legislation can be viewed as requiring the Court to explain its divergences
from the reports of the lower bodies. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text. The
statute simply requires the Court to "provide a proposed rule, an explanatory note on the rule,
and a written report explaining the [Court's] action, including any minority or other separate
views." 28 U.S.C. § 2073(d) (1988). However, the House Committee Report's requirement of
"gap reports" suggests that the Court has a duty to express itself when it differs from lower
rulemaking bodies. This would substantially burden the Court by requiring it to involve itself
in great detail in the rulemaking process and in the development of the rulemaking legislative
history. The Court may be unwilling and arguably unable to assume this burden. However,
reliance on rulemaking history created by the lower rulemaking bodies may be problematic.
Compare Dissenting Statement of Justice Scalia, 146 F.R.D. 507, 507-10 (1993) (decrying pro-
posed Rule 11 (c) making sanctions discretionary) and Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D.
587, 590 (1993) (stating that sanctions are discretionary under proposed Rule 11) with letter
from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Robert E. Kee-
ton, Chairman, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 1, 1992), 146
F.R.D. 519, 524, 525 (1993) (stating that Advisory Committee was retaining mandatory
sanctions).
262. See Jonakait, supra note 158, at 783-84 (criticizing plain meaning standard when ap-
plied to Federal Rules of Evidence because of the effect of freezing the law of evidence and
eliminating the dynamic aspect of the common law's development of evidence rules).
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stage especially appropriate. 263 Rules should be interpreted to reflect
changed circumstances. 264
Requiring the Court to apply a Rule rigidly without permitting the
Court to consider the policies behind the Rule would deprive the litigants
of a fair and just result in their case, thereby violating the central goal of
the Rules expressed in Rule 1.265 This would be true even if the Rule is
subsequently amended to serve those policy interests, because amend-
ments have to work their way through the often time-consuming
rulemaking process. As Professor Leo Levin has written in another con-
text, "We are dealing with the dynamic of procedural progress. '266 Rig-
idly interpreting the Rules without considering policy or purpose is
detrimental to that dynamic of progress and is unnecessary in the context
of the Rules because the Court is promulgator as well as interpreter.
In some ways, going beyond a plain meaning analysis involves the
Court in the development of federal common law regarding the Rules.
In both the statutory and Rules arenas, there is a continuum between the
interpretation of a text and the development of federal common law.267
In the Rules arena, an arena in which Congress has delegated a large
measure of the rulemaking power to the Court, the blending of the
proper standards for interpretation of the text of a Rule and for the de-
velopment of federal common law is particularly appropriate and
warranted.268
263. See supra Part I.B.
264. Cf Sunstein, supra note 167, at 493-97 (arguing that statutes should be interpreted to
reflect changed circumstances).
265. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (providing that the Rules "shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action").
266. A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U.
PA. L. REv. 1567, 1579 (1991) (referring to experimentation with local rules as a means of
dealing with the slow pace of national reform of the Rules).
267. See generally Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law,
99 HARV. L. REv. 881, 889-96 (1986) (arguing that there is no significant difference between
creation of federal common law and interpretation of federal statutes; the question in any case
is whether court has power to formulate law, under explicit or implicit provisions of Constitu-
tion or federal statutes); Merrill, supra note 31, at 7 (arguing for a broad definition of federal
common law, to include "'ordinary' statutory construction"). Compare the totally different
approach of a textualist, Judge Frank Easterbrook, who would preclude courts from creating
common law to construe statutes unless Congress had given express authorization. Easter-
brook, Statutes'Domain, supra note 250, at 544. Judge Easterbrook's approach is criticized by
many. See, eg., Sunstein, supra note 167, at 443-44.
268. As discussed thus far, the constraints of the separation of powers doctrine do not
preclude the Court's adoption of a common law approach--considering policy and purpose
when interpreting the Rules. Cf Merrill, supra note 31, at 12-32 (developing four limitations
on lawmaking powers of federal courts-federalism, separation of powers, electoral accounta-
bility, and Rules of Decision Act-and concluding that these limitations do not preclude fed-
eral courts from formulating procedural rules; also noting that Congress has exercised its
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Hence the plain meaning doctrine should be rejected as an unduly
narrow approach for cases involving interpretation of the Rules. The
views of the lower bodies involved in the rulemaking process are worth
attention, but should not be binding on the Court. The central goal of
the Court in interpreting the Rules in a particular case should be to con-
strue the Rules so as to comport best with their purposes and the policy
considerations behind them.269
D. Preferred Analysis of Federal Rules: The Rule 11 Cases Reconsidered
The Court's goal in interpreting or applying a Federal Rule should
be to construe and apply it in a fashion that furthers the purposes and
policies of the specific Rule in light of the structure of the Federal Rules
as a whole and the fit between the Rules and the overarching procedural
system. Specifically, after starting with an analysis of the language of a
rule, the Court should evaluate four significant factors:
(1) What was the purpose of the Rule in question, and how can that
purpose best be achieved? The Court can gather information regarding
the Rule's purpose from comments of drafting bodies and the Court, the
Court's own knowledge of the rulemaking process, academic commen-
tary, and other judicial opinions.
(2) What policies was the Rule designed to further, and what poli-
cies should it further in light of current conditions? This policy analysis
may include consideration of changed circumstances, the experience with
the Rule, and the ambiguities or gaps in the Rule.
(3) Should problems presented by a Rule be corrected in a particu-
lar case? If there have been difficulties with the interpretation or applica-
tion of a Rule, should those problems be corrected now, or is there
reason to delay until further rulemaking can occur? Fairness and due
process concerns for the litigants in the particular case are relevant
considerations.
(4) How does this Rule fit within the structure of the entire Federal
Rules and the overarching federal procedural system? Interpretation and
application of a particular Rule must be part of a coherent procedural
system that the mandate in Rule 1 for a just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action requires.
power through the Rules Enabling Act to establish a procedural framework for the federal
courts).
269. Cf Jonakait, supra note 158, at 785-86 (condemning plain meaning standard as ap-
plied to Federal Rules of Evidence for failing to consider policy goals of evidence law).
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This approach goes beyond a contextualist approach 270 by recogniz-
ing the formative role the Court may play in the development of the
Rules. 271 The primary advantages of this approach include: avoiding
the unnecessary freezing of the Rules, promoting the purposes and poli-
cies behind the Rules, and recognizing the Court's permitted role in the
promulgation of the Rules.
This approach, like an open-ended approach to statutory construc-
tion, could be criticized for failing to give precise answers in Rule (i.e.,
statutory) form.2 72 However, a set of exceedingly precise Rules might
well jeopardize the flexibility sought in the original concept of the Fed-
eral Rules. 273 Moreover, if the Court errs under this flexible approach to
interpretation, the normal rulemaking process or direct congressional in-
tervention (in rare instances) would be available to put the Rules back on
track.
How would this suggested approach affect the outcomes of the three
cases involving Rule 11 ? Consider first the issue of sanctioning the indi-
vidual attorney's law firm decided in Pavelic & LeFlore. Under the rec-
ommended approach, the analysis should proceed as follows: Pursuant
to Rule 11, when a paper is signed in violation of the Rule, an appropri-
ate sanction shall be imposed "upon the person who signed it, a repre-
sented party, or both. ' 274 The language of this portion of Rule 11 would
allow two interpretations. The first possibility is that the person who
signed means the person who physically signed his or her name. A sec-
ond possibility is that the person who signed means the person or legal
270. See generally Sunstein, supra note 167, at 424-34 (describing a contextualist approach
as involving consideration of context, structure, purpose, intent, and legislative history of a
statute).
271. Moreover, it is not as complicated as Professor Sunstein's structure for interpretive
norms for statutes. See id. at 462-503. However, many of his principles of statutory interpre-
tation are relevant to the Court in construing and applying the Rules, e.g., avoidance of consti-
tutional problems, consistency, consideration of systemic effects, and avoidance of injustice
and irrationality.
272. Cf Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
CORNELL L. REv. 270, 339 (1989) (urging consideration of more specific and precise Rules
while decrying courts' application of Rules so as to inhibit public law litigation).
273. See Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 63, at 2082-83 (arguing that the Court
should have more leeway in interpreting the Rules than the plain meaning analysis would
allow; that undue detail or complexity in the Rules may defeat substantive rights; and that the
courts should be given discretion to interpret the rules in the cases before them to effectuate
the substantive goals in statutes and the Constitution). But see Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules
and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 693, 715 (1988) [hereinafter Burbank, Rules and Discretion] (criticizing "the trend of
modem procedural law [that] has been away from rules that make policy choices towards
those that confer on trial courts a substantial amount of normative discretion").
274. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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entity on whose behalf the signature was made. In other sections, the
Rule uses the term "signer" to refer to the attorney who signs the paper,
but here it uses the term "person who signed." This difference in phrase-
ology was not addressed by either the Advisory Committee in its Notes
or other proceedings, or by the Court in its official statements approving
the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 that contained this language.
The scope of entities that can be sanctioned under Rule 11 raises
important policy issues. The generally accepted primary purpose of Rule
11 is to deter abusive filings-papers filed in court that lack a reasonable
basis in fact or law.275 This purpose is achieved by threatening and im-
posing appropriate sanctions on those who file papers without undertak-
ing a reasonable inquiry into their factual or legal basis. On the one
hand, limiting sanctions to the individual attorney signing the paper will
compel that individual to bear the full cost of sanctions and may be par-
ticularly effective in ensuring individual compliance with Rule 11. On
the other hand, allowing the individual attorney's law firm to be sanc-
tioned as well as (or instead of) the individual may cause the law firm to
institute measures to ensure that its attorneys will comply with the Rule
and to monitor its attorneys' behavior. In light of Rule I l's mandate
giving broad discretion to the district judge in fashioning sanctions, 276
and given the absence of any empirical evidence supporting either hy-
pothesis as to the effects of imposing sanctions upon the firm 277 it should
275. The Advisory Committee stated that the purpose of Rule 11 is to "discourage dila-
tory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous
claims or defenses." Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules-1983 Amendment, 28 U.S.C.
app. at 576. See also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990) (stating that
"the central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in district court and... streamline
the administration and procedure of the federal courts"); Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel En-
tertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989); Robert L. Carter, The History and Purposes of Rule
11, 54 FORDHAM. L. REV. 4 (1985) (stressing purpose of deterring frivolous or groundless
pleadings or motions); William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1013,
1020 (1988) (rejecting compensation as a purpose of Rule 11 and focusing on deterrence as the
primary purpose).
276. The Rule requires the trial judge to impose an "appropriate sanction." FED. R. CIv.
P. 11.
277. Recently, some empirical evidence has been developed concerning the impact of Rule
11 on particular kinds of litigants. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. BURBANK, AMERICAN JUDICATURE
SOCIETY, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (1989) [hereinafter BURBANK, RULE 11]; THOMAS
E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS (1988);
Melissa L. Nelken, The Impact of Federal Rule 11 on Lawyers and Judges in the Northern
District of California, 74 JUDICATURE 147 (1990); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical
Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988).
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be within the trial judge's power to impose sanctions on a law firm as
well as (or instead of) the individual attorney signer.278
This suggested approach to rule interpretation is consistent with the
approach taken by Justice O'Connor in Cooter & Gell. This is not sur-
prising, since the Cooter & Gell Court went beyond a plain meaning anal-
ysis, perhaps because there was no relevant portion of.Rule 11 directly
addressing the three questions before it. Thus Cooter & Gell illustrates
that the plain meaning analysis is not a useful tool when there is ambigu-
ity or silence in the Rule itself.279 However, the Court's decision may
278. In 1991 the Advisory Committee proposed amendments to Rule 11 that included
permitting the imposition of sanctions on an attorney's law firm, thereby removing the restric-
tions imposed by Pavelic & LeElore's interpretation of Rule 11. COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
PRELIMINARY DRAFr OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (August 1991), reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53,
80 (1991) [hereinafter COMM. ON RULES]. This proposal could be viewed as suggesting that
the Court's plain meaning analysis in Pavelic & LeFlore did not adequately reflect the purpose
and policy behind the Rule.
In 1992 the Advisory Committee, after considering comments and suggestions, proposed
an amendment to Rule 11 which overturned Pavelic & LeFlore and clarified that normally a
law firm should be jointly liable for violations by its employees. COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMS, (May 1992),
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 535, 581 (1993). See also id. at 588-89 (explaining that proposed Rule
I l(c)(1)(A) would "remove the restrictions of the former rule," citing Pavelic & LeFlore, and
explaining that "it is appropriate that the law firm ordinarily be viewed as jointly responsible
under established principles of agency"); id. at 525 (transmittal letter from Sam C. Pointer, Jr.,
Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, May 1, 1992, explaining addition of language
in proposed Rule 11 (c)(1)(A) to clarify liability of law firm). No further changes to this
provision were made in the rulemaking process.
Thus, on April 22, 1993, the Court transmitted to Congress proposed the amendments to
Rule 11 that provide: "Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly
responsible for violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees." Proposed
Rule ll(c)(1)(A), 61 U.S.L.W. 4365, 4370 (Apr. 27, 1993). Therefore, if Congress accedes to
the proposal, the result in Pavelic will in fact be overturned by rule amendment. It is interest-
ing that Justice Scalia, the author of Pavelic, did not object to this proposal, although he vehe-
mently dissented from what he viewed as the watering-down of Rule 11 in other ways. 61
U.S.L.W. 4393 n.1. See supra note 144.
279. There are other very current examples of cases in which the Court does not consider
a plain meaning analysis of a particular Rule to be appropriate, even when the entire opinion
revolves around a Rule. A recent example of this phenomenon is the opinion of Justice Mar-
shall for a unanimous Court in Firstier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S.
269 (1991). In Firstier Mortgage, a notice of appeal was filed after the district judge announced
his intention to grant summary judgment, but before the actual entry of judgment and before
the parties responded to the court's request to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law. The issue was whether this procedure complied with the provisions of FED. R. APP. P.
4(a)(2) that a notice of appeal "filed after the announcement of a decision or order but before
the entry of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day
thereof," thereby making the notice of appeal timely for preserving the right to appeal. Es-
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still be criticized for its resolution of the particular policy issues
involved.280
Finally, the Business Guides opinion would be analyzed differently
under the preferred approach. Rule 11 provides that "[t]he signature of
an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer"
has made reasonable inquiry and is satisfied that the paper is well
grounded in fact and law. It is plausible that this language, in the con-
text of the Rule as a whole, refers either to all signing parties or simply to
parties who are unrepresented and whose signatures are therefore re-
quired. The policy behind Rule 11, however, is to deter filings that have
no reasonable foundation in fact or law.21l This deterrence policy is best
achieved by imposing a duty of reasonable inquiry upon every person
who signs a paper that is filed in court and that is otherwise within the
scope of Rule 11. 282 The reasonableness of the inquiry will depend on
the nature of the person signing the document. For example, a lawyer's
duty to investigate may be more substantial than that of the client with
respect to the law, and on some occasions the client's duty to investigate
may be more substantial with respect to the facts. 28 3
chewing a plain meaning analysis, the Court unanimously determined that the Rule should be
interpreted to permit a premature filing of a notice of appeal from a decision, even a nonfinal
decision, when the decision would be appealable if immediately entered as a judgment. Id. at
274-75. The Court looked to the Advisory Committee Notes, and cases cited therein, to dis-
cern which interpretation of the Rule was most consistent with the drafters' intent. Id.
280. See, e.g., Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 487-90 (1991) [hereinafter Vairo, Where We Are] (criticizing Court's
resolution of policy issues in Cooter & Gell). The proposed amendments to Rule 11 do not
substantially alter the results reached in Cooter & Gell. See supra text accompanying notes
185-187. With respect to the issue of timing of sanctions, the proposed rule does require a
court acting on its own initiative to issue an order to show cause prior to a voluntary dismissal
or settlement, Proposed Rule 11(c)(2)(B), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 583 (1993). The Advi-
sory Committee determined not to propose revision of Rule 11 regarding standards for appel-
late review, viewing this appellate review matter as inappropriate for civil rules review, see 146
F.R.D. at 525 (1993), but referred in its Committee Notes to the current standard established
in Cooter & Gell. 146 F.R.D. at 590. Finally, the proposed Rule is silent regarding the issue of
expenses on appeal, probably also because of the limitation of the Rules to the trial court level.
281. See supra note 275.
282. This, of course, is a basic policy judgment that must be made by the Court on the
basis of all available materials, including the empirical evidence and the views of commenta-
tors, judges, academics, and practitioners. Others may have different views, believing perhaps
that not all signing parties should be within the Rule. See, e.g., Vairo, Where We Are, supra
note 280, at 490-91 (criticizing majority for imposing Rule 11 sanctions on yet another target).
283. Proposed Rule 11 (b) imposes the duty of certification after reasonable inquiry upon
"an attorney or unrepresented party." 146 F.R.D. at 420, 579 (emphasis added). Moreover, in
the proposed amendments transmitted by the Court to Congress, Rule 1 (c)(2)(A) would pro-
hibit monetary sanctions against represented parties for violating 1 l(b)(2), which requires that
legal contentions be warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for change in the
law. 146 F.R.D. at 423, 582. The Advisory Committee Notes justify this provision on the
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The scope of papers encompassed within Rule 11 must be deter-
mined in light of other Rules governing certain specialized papers. Affi-
davits are governed by Rule 56(g) with respect to summary judgment
motions. Rule 56(g) specifically provides that if "affidavits presented
pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose
of delay," the wrongdoer shall pay expenses including reasonable attor-
ney's fees incurred by the other party.284 Absent amendment to Rule 11
or 56(g) clarifying the scope of each, the Court should apply Rule 56(g)
to the extent it is relevant. To do so would limit Rule I l's application in
the context of affidavits in summary judgment motions. Otherwise, Rule
11 applies to all papers filed in court, including affidavits filed in support
of other motions.285
When alternative interpretations of a Rule's language are possible,
evaluating the different policy implications of the alternatives is sensible.
It permits the interpretation of a Rule to comport with the basic policy
interests motivating the adoption of the particular Rule. It is appropriate
for the Court as rule interpreter to consider the policy implications of
alternative interpretations of Rules it has participated in promulgating.
This approach will also permit an interactive role in the rulemaking
process, facilitating the ongoing amendment process of the Rules. For
example, in 1991 the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules proposed sev-
ground that "[m]onetary responsibility for such violations is more properly placed solely on
the party's attorneys. With this limitation, the rule should not be subject to attack under the
Rules Enabling Act." Aa at 589. The Advisory Committee then cites Business Guides. Id.
This position reflects a change from an earlier Advisory Committee proposal, which would
have allowed monetary sanctions against represented parties only where the party was respon-
sible for violating proposed Rule 1 l(b)(1) (filing papers to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase cost). See Letter from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, to Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure (May 1, 1992), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 525 (1993).
284. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(g).
285. Similarly, FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) establishes the framework for signatures and certifi-
cations on discovery requests, responses, and objections. Rule 26(g) will govern those areas
even though these documents are technically within the broad scope of Rule li's applicability
to papers. In many ways, the certification requirements under Rule 26(g) are similar to those
under Rule 11, although the former also addresses the requirement that the discovery be pro-
portionate to the case. The key is that the more specific Rule should govern, rather than the
more general Rule.
As transmitted by the Court to Congress, proposed Rule 1 l(d) states that Rule 11 does
not apply to discovery matters subject to Rules 26-37. Proposed Rule 1 l(d), 146 F.R.D. 405,
423-24 (1993). Thus, the Court's proposal explicitly removes discovery matters from the scope
of Rule 11. The Advisory Committee Notes explain that "[iut is appropriate that Rules 26
through 37, which are specially designed for the discovery process, govern such documents
and conduct rather than the more general provisions of Rule 11." Advisory Committee Notes,
146 F.R.D. at 592 (1993). Unfortunately, there is no parallel coordinating provision in the
proposal for summary judgment affidavits.
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eral amendments to Rule 11.286 After notice and comment, the Advisory
Committee substantially revised its proposed changes and submitted final
proposed amendments to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure in 1992.287 The proposed amendments to Rule 11 were
then transmitted to Congress by the Court on April 22, 1 9 9 3 .2S8 One
proposal would require a party to be notified in writing that its conduct
may possibly violate Rule 11 before sanctions could be imposed. 289 This
would afford the party an opportunity to respond or alter its behavior to
avoid sanctions.290 Another proposed change would permit parties to
286. COMM. ON RULES, supra note 278, at 53. These proposals have themselves generated
substantial controversy. See, e.g., Bench-Bar Proposal to Revise Civil Procedure Rule 11, 137
F.R.D. 159 (1991); Sam D. Johnson et al., The Proposed Amendments to Rule 11: Urgent
Problems and Suggested Solutions, 43 BAYLOR L. REV. 647 (1991) (suggesting revision of
proposed amendment to Rule 11); Randall Samborn, Rule 11 Reforms Are Criticized, NAT'L
L. J., May 25, 1992, at 3 (discussing criticisms of Rule 11 reforms); Vairo, Where We Are,
supra note 280 (criticizing the rule as a tool to limit advocacy in federal courts).
287. Letter from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to
Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May
1, 1992), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519 (1993). Attachment B to the letter discusses the criti-
cisms received and the changes made by the Advisory Committee in reaching its final proposal.
Id. at 521.
288. Proposed Rule 11, 146 F.R.D. 405, 419-424 (1993). The proposals are pending
before Congress, and will become effective if no change is made by Congress before December
1, 1993. The proposals for change to Rule 11 remain controversial; Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, dissented from the amendment of Rule 11, complaining that it "gutted" the
Rule. Id at 513.
289. The amendment provides in relevant part:
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the
court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the
conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law
firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
(1) How Initiated.
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made sepa-
rately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged
to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be
filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion
(or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, de-
fense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately cor-
rected....
(3) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing
an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b)
with respect thereto.
Proposed Rule 1 l(c)(1)(A), (B), 146 F.R.D. 405, 421-22 (1993).
290. As transmitted by the Court to Congress, proposed Rule ll(c)(1)(A) allows a party
twenty-one days to withdraw or correct the offending paper to avoid the imposition of sanc-
tions. See supra note 289. Technically, this proposal delays the filing of a motion for sanctions
with the court for twenty-one days from the service of the motion for sanctions on the offend-
ing party. This results in a three-week "grace" period in which the offending party may avoid
sanctions by withdrawal or correction of the paper.
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make assertions in court documents that they expect will have an eviden-
tiary basis "after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery," rather than requiring that the evidentiary basis be evident at
the time of filing the paper.291 A third proposed change would limit
sanctions "to what is sufficient to deter," providing somewhat more gui-
dance than the current standard of "appropriate" sanctions. 292
These three proposed changes now transmitted to Congress illus-
trate the modem operation of rulemaking. They all suggest, albeit in
somewhat different respects, that the Court's involvement at an earlier
stage-by interpreting the current language of the Rule-could permit
implementation of evolving policies. Take, for example, the proposed
amendment to limit sanctions to those that are sufficient to deter. Such a
limitation could have been read into the current language of the Rule by
the Court in a case defining "appropriate" sanctions. The Court could
have interpreted the language of the existing rule in several different
ways, including defining "appropriate" sanctions as those that constitute
the greatest possible deterrent consistent with due process limitations.
Alternatively, the Court could have developed a concept of minimal de-
terrence, or of sufficient deterrence. Thus, there is substantial leeway for
an interpreting body in defining the scope of sanctions that provide deter-
rence. Moreover, the Court could have shifted its focus from the deter-
rence approach to a punitive or compensatory approach that includes
sanctions which penalize the wrongdoer or compensate the victim for the
harm suffered. These latter ideas of punishment and compensation ex-
pand beyond the generally understood original purpose of Rule II to
deter abusive practice.293 However, it would be appropriate for the
291. The proposed amendment provides:
[A]n attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances,- ...
(3) The allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if spe-
cifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable oppor-
tunity for further investigation or discovery ....
Proposed Rule 1 (b)(3), 146 F.R.D. 405, 420-21 (1993).
292. The language provides: "A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited
to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others simi-
larly situated." Proposed Rule 11(c)(2), 146 F.R.D. 405, 422-23 (1993).
The proposed amendments make other significant changes to Rule 11, notably providing
that sanctions will be discretionary rather than mandatory. The current Rule's language stat-
ing that the court "shall impose ... an appropriate sanction," FED. R. CIV. P. 11, will be
changed to permissive language, so that "the court may... impose an appropriate sanction."
Proposed Rule 11(c), 146 F.R.D. 405, 421 (1993). Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas)
dissented from this change from mandatory to discretionary sanctions. Id. at 507.
293. See supra note 275 (describing that the generally understood original purpose of Rule
11 was to deter abusive filings). Recently, the punitive purpose and features of Rule 11 have
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Court's interpretation of "appropriate sanctions" under Rule 11 to
evolve with experience under the Rule. 294 A broad-based analysis of pol-
icy and purpose when interpreting Rules would afford flexibility and
would complement the rulemaking process.295
Consider the new proposal to require notification before a party files
a motion to sanction the other party for Rule 11 violations. This new
procedural requirement is not mentioned in the current Rule. However,
the Court could have adopted a similar kind of notification require-
ment as a method of assuring due process if a case arose in which a
party would not be on notice that its conduct potentially violated Rule
11 until sanctions were sought. 296  Even though the plain language
of the Rule does not address this matter, it would be appropriate
for the Court to create such a requirement in its decisional role,297
been noted. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1076, 1081 (1992) ("Rule 11 is designed to
punish a party who has already violated the court's rules.") (unanimous opinion) (Rehnquist,
C.J.); see also Judith A. McMorrow, Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 959, 972 ("Rule 11 is a disciplinary tool."). Others have noted a compensatory function.
See WILLGING, supra note 277, at 4, 23-33. See generally BURBANK, RULE 11, supra note 277,
at 10-13 (discussing purposes of Rule 11); SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE
11 SANCTIONs 29 (1985) (stating that purpose of Rule 11 was to punish the offender, compen-
sate the injured, and deter future abuse); Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Fed-
eral Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and
Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313 (1986) (describing different theories of the purpose of Rule 11).
294. Cf Johnson, supra note 286 (considering appropriate sanctions in light of experience,
criticizing proposed amendment of Rule 11, and urging restriction of award of attorney's fees
as remedy for Rule 11 violations).
295. Suggesting the Court should take a more activist role when interpreting the Rules is
not intended, however, to denigrate the advantages of the rulemaking process. Current efforts
at rulemaking afford an alternative mechanism for reaching resolution on what sanctions are
appropriate. Indeed, the rulemaking efforts currently being undertaken, which involve sub-
stantial segments of the bench, bar, and academics, may offer the best hope for a broadly based
consensus resolving this and other controversial areas of Rule 11.
296. See, e.g., WILLGING, supra note 277, at 92-97 (discussing methods lower courts have
developed to afford notice to attorneys that sanctions are being considered by the courts).
297. Despite the argument that the Court should have the power to frame notification
requirements as part of its decision of a case, there are certainly advantages to using the
rulemaking process, which provides an opportunity for thorough evaluation by all interested
persons in advance. See Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 650 (1960), quoted in Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2144 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that rulemaking
procedures designed by Congress to assure that procedural innovations "shall be introduced
only after mature consideration of informed opinion from all relevant quarters, with all the
opportunities for comprehensive and integrated treatment which such consideration affords").
However, judicial decisionmaking has led the way as one of the primary mechanisms in pro-
moting the adoption of new provisions for or amendments to the Rules. For example, Mont-
gomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940), set out the framework of the proper
approach for judges in considering judgment n.o.v. and new trial motions. This approach was
largely codified in Rule 50(c) and (d). See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules-1963
Amendment, reprinted in 83 S.Ct. 50, 71 (1962). Another example is FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(2),
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
INTERPRETING THE FEDERAL RULES
especially because the question of appropriate notice raises due process
concerns.
2 98
A more activist approach to interpreting the Federal Rules by con-
sidering the Rules' policy and purpose is also consistent with the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Chambers v. NASCO, Ina 299 uphold-
ing the inherent power of the federal courts to "fashion an appropriate
sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process. ' '3°° The Court
affirmed the imposition of attorney's fees, amounting to all fees paid by a
party to its attorneys during the course of litigation, when the party be-
ing sanctioned evidenced bad faith throughout the entire litigation, had
attempted to mislead, lie to, and defraud the trial court, and had tried to
deprive the court of jurisdiction. The Court acknowledged that although
much of the party's conduct could be sanctioned under particular rules
such as Rule 11, some of the bad faith conduct was beyond the scope of
such rules. The Court held:
In circumstances such as these in which all of a litigant's conduct is
deemed sanctionable, requiring a court first to apply rules and statutes
containing sanctioning provisions to discrete occurrences before invok-
ing inherent power to address remaining instances of sanctionable con-
duct would serve only to foster extensive and needless satellite
litigation, which is contrary to the aim of the rules themselves.301
According to Justice White, writing for a 5-4 majority, reliance upon the
district court's inherent power would not circumvent the other precise
sanction rules.30 2
which codifies prevailing appellate decisions that give effect to premature notices of appeal.
Firstier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 274 (1991). See also
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), in which the Court developed principles of attorney
work product protection that were later incorporated into Rule 26(b)(3).
298. Cf Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sanctions, Symmetry, and Safe Harbors: Limiting Misappli-
cation of Rule 11 by Harmonizing It with Pre-verdict Dismissal Devices, 60 FORDHAM L. REv.
257, 261 (1991) (proposing that a proper reading of the existing Rule 11 requires "that any
claim that has survived the pre-verdict stages of litigation be immune from Rule 11
sanctions").
299. 111 S. Ct. at 2123.
300. Id. at 2133.
301. At at 2136.
302. Justice White often referred to particular standards and sanctions in Rule 11 and in
28 U.S.C. § 1927 that authorized a sanction of attorney's fees to be imposed on attorneys who
"unreasonably and vexatiously multiply proceedings." He emphasized that these standards do
not displace the inherent powers of a court to prevent the abuse of the judicial process and to
fashion appropriate sanctions, including imposing "attorney's fees when a party has 'acted in
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."' 111 S. Ct. at 2133 (quoting
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975)). For exam-
ple, Justice White wrote:
But neither is a federal court forbidden to sanction bad-faith conduct by means of the
inherent power simply because that conduct could also be sanctioned under the stat-
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It is ironic that around the same time the Court was deciding several
Rule 11 cases in a literalist mode, it was willing to embrace a broad view
of the inherent powers of the federal courts in Chambers. Arguably,
there is substantial tension, even conflict, between these two lines of
cases. Plain meaning devotees would be expected to apply the language
of Rule 11 that makes sanctions mandatory to all papers filed in violation
of the certification requirement, and then to consider whether there is
any inherent power of the federal court to fill the interstices (e.g., fraudu-
lent oral statements). Allowing the court to impose a sanction for a
wrong that is only partly covered by Rule 1 l's explicit provisions seems
to recognize that federal courts have broader powers than a literalist ap-
proach normally would approve.
Arguably, even Justice Kennedy's dissenting approach in Chambers
went beyond the plain meaning enthusiasts' limits. Because Rule 1 l's
mandate of sanctions for papers filed in violation of its certification re-
quirements is a clearcut rule, a literalist might argue that by implication
there is no power to impose sanctions for abuses not specified in the Rule.
However, as the majority points out in Chambers, there are passages in
the Advisory Committee Notes suggesting the courts retain inherent
powers to police conduct that implicates their jurisdiction or the conduct
of judicial proceedings.303
ute or the rules. A court must, of course, exercise caution in invoking its inherent
power, and it must comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining
that the requisite bad-faith exists and in assessing fees. Furthermore, when there is
bad-faith conduct in the course of litigation that could be adequately sanctioned
under the rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the rules rather than the inherent
power. But if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor the rules
are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power.
Id. at 2135-36 (citation omitted). Although Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, he basi-
cally agreed with the position expressed in the majority opinion. However, according to Jus-
tice Scalia, the majority improperly imposed sanctions at least in part for the party's bad-faith
breach of contract. Thus Justice Scalia emphasized that the exercise of a court's inherent
power is limited to conduct affecting the trial. Id. at 2140-41.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Souter, dissented on the
grounds that the specific sanctioning provisions must be exhausted before a court may invoke
its inherent powers. Justice Kennedy also argued that the court was allowing sanctions to be
imposed for prelitigation conduct-the breach of contract. Id. at 2141. The dissent urged that
because the Rules require imposition of sanctions in certain circumstances, the Rules must be
applied before a court may rely on its inherent powers, both because of the mandatory lan-
guage of the Rules and because of the circumvention of the rulemaking process if the Court did
otherwise. Id. at 2141-49. The dissent concluded that "[i]t may be that the District Court
could have imposed the full million dollar sanction against petitioner through reliance on fed-
eral Rules and statutes, as well as on a proper exercise of its inherent authority. But we should
remand here because a federal court must decide cases based on legitimate sources of power."
Id. at 2149.
303. See, e.g., id. at 2134-35; supra notes 31, 32.
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The recommended approach-that the Court engage actively in in-
terpreting the Rules rather than rigidly applying a plain meaning analy-
sis-would not necessarily produce a different result than plain meaning
analysis would in a specific case. However, a more activist role in inter-
preting the Rules would assure implementation of the purposes and poli-
cies sought to be furthered by a particular Rule and by the Federal Rules
as a whole. This purpose and policy approach to interpretation would
not replace rulemaking, but would be an appropriate accompaniment to
the Court's role in the modem rulemaking process.
Indeed, the whole experience with Rule 11, including both the Rule
11 interpretation cases discussed in Section A of Part II and the rulemak-
ing changes to Rule 11 discussed in this Section, demonstrate the poten-
tial synergy between a more activist approach to rule interpretation and
the rulemaking process. Several matters resolved in Pavelic, Cooter &
Gell, and Business Guides under variants of the plain meaning analysis
were modified in the proposals transmitted by the Court to Congress in
1993.304 Under a more activist approach to rule interpretation, the
Court would have had the flexibility to develop these aspects through
rule interpretation, rather than being rigidly restricted by plain meaning
analysis and being permitted to consider policy and purpose only in its
rulemaking role.
ML Comparison of the Court's Proper Role in Interpretation
of Rules With Its Role in Rulemaking
Part I of this Article explored a modem view of the Court's proper
role in rulemaking. The current view of some scholars and the House
Judiciary Committee suggests that restrictions on the scope of the
Court's rulemaking powers have a different justification from that origi-
nally emphasized in the classic Supreme Court opinions in Sibbach and
Hanna,305 and that legislation, rather than judicial rulemaking, is appro-
priate when proposed rules involve policy choices that have an impact on
304. Pavelic will be overturned by the proposed amendment of Rule 1l(c)(1)(A), discussed
supra in note 278, allowing law firms as well as individual signers to be sanctioned. Cooter &
Gell will be modified by proposed Rule I 1(c)(2)(B), which provides, "Monetary sanctions may
not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a
voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose
attorneys are, to be sanctioned." Business Guides will be limited by proposed Rule 11(b),
which imposes duties on attorneys or unrepresented parties, and by. proposed Rule
11(c)(2)(A), which prohibits award of monetary sanctions against a represented party for vio-
lation of the requirement that legal contentions are warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous
argument for its modification. 61 U.S.L.W. 4365, 4369-70 (Apr. 27, 1993).
305. See supra text accompanying notes 10-16.
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substantive rights.306 At a minimum, the recent history of Congress's
involvement in the rulemaking process suggests a more limited sphere for
judicial rulemaking (or at least a more expansive scope of congressional
review). Part II of this Article analyzed the Court's use of the plain
meaning doctrine in interpreting the Federal Rules and concluded that a
literalist approach to the Rules is inappropriate. Based on this conclu-
sion, Part II argued that the Court should take a more activist role in
interpreting the Rules by considering the policy and purpose behind
them. These two positions are not antithetical. Indeed, a more activist
role in interpreting the Rules permits the Court to do what it can do
best-develop federal common law interpreting Federal Rules in light of
their underlying policy and purpose on a case by case basis.
The discomfort of several former Justices with their role in promul-
gating the Rules, given the lack of time and staff for undertaking the
development or thorough review of proposals, highlights the difficulty of
the Court becoming more actively involved in the rulemaking process.
The trend in the recent past has been to develop a larger infrastructure of
committees and to emphasize an opportunity for public notice, comment,
and criticism, making the Supreme Court's rulemaking role even more
limited.
Once Rules have been promulgated through the rulemaking process
prescribed by the Rules Enabling Act, they will be applied in cases to
which they pertain. At that point, two different questions of interpreta-
tion may arise. One, the question of the validity of a particular Rule, is
frequently debated, but is not addressed here. The other key interpreta-
tive question, evaluated earlier in this Article, is how to apply a valid
Rule to a particular case. In the latter, much more common situation,
the Court should embrace the opportunity to interpret a Rule in light of
the procedural policy choices embedded in the Rule. The Court should
adopt a more activist approach toward interpretation, refraining from
wooden application of a plain meaning analysis that was developed in the
context of statutory interpretation.
This recommended approach recognizes the dual roles of the Court
as rulemaker and rule interpreter. 30 7 Once Rules have been promulgated
and are being applied in particular cases, the determination of the proper
306. See, e.g., Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 10, at 1019-20.
307. Cf Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 10, at 1021 ("[W]hen the Supreme Court
makes law through supervisory court rules, it is engaged in an enterprise that, both practically
and normatively, is different in important respects from the enterprise in which the Court, or
any federal court, is engaged when it makes federal common law."); Landers, supra note 27, at
854-55 n.43 (distinguishing Court's powers of establishing common law from rulemaking
powers).
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interpretation and application of a Rule should be informed by many
considerations beyond the simple literal language of the Rule. Chief
among these considerations are the purpose of the Rule, the policies ad-
vanced by the Rule, the relationship between the particular Rule and the
Federal Rules framework, potential conflicts with other Federal Rules,
and relationship to policies furthered in statutory and constitutional
provisions.
A more activist approach to interpretation of the Rules does not
conflict with, but rather enhances, the Court's role in formulating Rules.
The recommended approach recognizes the frequently expressed reserva-
tion of the Court's members to an expanded role for the Court in the
rulemaking process. Yet the suggested approach offers the Court an op-
portunity to consider the entire context when interpreting a Federal Rule
and to determine how the Rule would best be applied and interpreted in
the context of the policies and purposes of both the particular Rule and
the structure of the Federal Rules as a whole. An opportunity to con-
sider the entire context will ensure that the Court plays a significant role
in the process of reforming the Rules so as to further the basic goal of
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of litigation. Although it is
possible to reach the same ultimate position through a strict textualist
approach to the Rules combined with more frequent rulemaking,30 8 the
more activist approach to interpretation would achieve immediate results
in concrete cases, and would not relegate litigants in actual cases to the
ephemeral hope of a timely rulemaking change.
The rigidity and ultimate futility of the plain meaning analysis must
be recognized. What is plain to one person, whether lawyer, judge or
layperson, is not necessarily plain to another. It is misleading to pretend
that language is plain. Moreover, what is plain in one context may not
be plain in another.30 9 The Court's consideration of the purpose and pol-
icy of a Rule offers much more flexibility and a greater opportunity to
achieve the goals of "just, speedy and inexpensive" determination than a
rigid plain meaning approach. This recommended approach to Rule in-
terpretation would complement the role of the Court in the modem
rulemaking process.
308. Cf Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 WIs. L. Rv. 415, 460-61 (suggesting
that judges should go beyond the language of Rule 24(a)(2) and look to policies and concepts
not explicitly stated in the Rule; noting, however, that given judicial reservations to such an
approach, formal amendment of the Rule was desirable).
309. Cf Burbank, Rules and Discretion, supra note 273, at 701-09 (discussing multiple
plain meanings given to Rule 3 by the Court).
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